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ARTICLES

THE CYNICAL SUCCESSES OF THE GUANT iNAMO BAY
MILITARY COMMISSIONS

G. ALEX

SINHA*

ABSTRACT
Since they werefirstauthorized in the weeks after the 9/11 attacks, the
Guantdnamo Bay Military Commissions-specialmilitary tribunalsforthe
trial ofcertain terror suspects-have generated eight minor convictions at
a cost ofover one billion dollars. Nearly hafofthe convictions have been
vacated on appeal. The three ongoing contested cases, including the case
against those accused of complicity in the 9/11 attacks, remain mired in
pretrial proceedings.
The biggest storylines emanating from the
commissions do not concern convictions, but rather government
surveillance of the defense teams and the compelled recusal ofjudges for
the appearanceofpartiality toward the government. Focusing largely on
the unique structuralfeatures of the commissions, such as the remote
location of the commissions that helps explain their cost or the rules of
evidence that are unusuallyfavorableto the prosecution, scholars and other
observers have consistently and understandablydescribedthe commissions
asfailures.
This Article argues that we have been looking at the commissions all
wrong. First, the structuralfeaturesofthe commissions are not the primary
drivers of their performance. The more fundamental problem is one of
ethos: officials associated with the commissions consistently prioritize
objectives other than dispatch, transparency, and public confidence.
Second, that prevailing culture was injected into the commissions
deliberately at their founding and remains broadly consonant with the
governing norms of the broader War on Terror. The commissions have
indeed failed the American people, but not because they were badly
designed; rather, it is because they have done exactly what they were
designed to do. These conclusions have significant implicationsfor our
understanding of the importance of the informal norms that overlay the
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structuralfeatures of any justice system, as well as lessonsfor the War on
Terror specifically.
INTRODUCTION

Since their controversial beginnings, there has been no shortage of
criticism of the Guantinamo Bay Military Commissions, special military
tribunals convened in the wake of the 9/11 attacks to try certain foreign
individuals charged with terrorism-related offenses. As described in more detail
below, advocates, observers, and participants have critiqued many structural or
formal features of the commissions, such as their purported constitutional
problems,' the possibility that they violate U.S. treaty obligations, 2 their specific
evidentiary rules, 3 their reliance on non-Article III judges,4 their appellate

1. See Harold Hongju Koh, The Case Against Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'LL. 337,
338 (2002) (citing a statement signed by hundreds of law professors expressing concern that the
initial version of the commissions violated the separation of powers).
2. See id. at 338-39 (suggesting the original commissions may have violated the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Third Geneva Convention).
3. See George Lardner Jr., On Left and Right, Concern Over Anti-TerrorismMoves, WASH.
POST (Nov. 16, 2001), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/11/16/on-left-andright-concern-over-anti-terrorism-moves/6e6d0193-lab4-4a4a-9c67b52dl892c889/?utm term=.2918526cOceb (noting concerns about the commissions held by people
across the political spectrum, specifically including criticisms expressed by the director of the Cato

Institute's project on criminal justice about the commissions' standards for admitting evidence);
Zachary Katznelson, GuantdnamoPleaDeal Taintedby Torture, ACLU (Feb. 29,2012,12:42 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/detention/guantanamo-plea-deal-tainted-torture

(describing a particular commission plea deal as "tainted by torture" because the defendant had
allegedly been abused in U.S. custody and "[t]he military commissions system allows coerced
evidence to be used"); see also Carol Rosenberg, How Long After Torture Are Statements
Admissible? Guantdnamo Court Debates Question, MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 4, 2017, 6:00 AM),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/guantanamo/articlel65305107.html (describing some of the more recent
commission litigation over the admission of hearsay and statements obtained from a detainee who
was tortured).
4.

See Timothy H. Edgar, Interested Persons Memorandum Regarding the "Military

Commission OrderNo. 1," ACLU (Apr. 16, 2002), https://www.aclu.org/other/interested-personsmemorandum-regarding-military-commission-order-no-1 (arguing that capital commissions cases
should be tried in an Article III court); but see Peter Margulies, Justice at War: Military Tribunals

and Article III, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 305 (2015) (generally defending the use of Article Imilitary
tribunals).
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structure,' their inefficiency, 6 and more.7 Although the commissions have
improved on some structural measures since they were first created, many of
the criticisms persist.
The cumulative heft of these widely-perceived
deficiencies has led multiple observers and advocates to regard the commissions
as failures.8
National security law scholar Steve Vladeck recently joined this chorus as
a result of some particularly dramatic developments in the ongoing trial of Abd
al-Rahim al-Nashiri, who stands accused of (among other crimes)
masterminding the October 2000 bombing of the U.SS. Cole.9 Specifically, in

5. See Steve Vladeck, The Misbegotten Court of Military Commission Review, LAWFARE
(May 24,2016,12:00 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/misbegotten-court-military-commissionreview (critiquing the appellate court at the commissions, which, like the trial-level system, was

also created from scratch).
6. See, e.g., Robert Loeb& Helen Klein Murillo, Advice from the D.C. Circuit-Nashiri and
Khadr, LAWFARE (May 23, 2016, 1:35 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/advice-dc-circuit-

nashiri-and-khadr ("At nearly every turn, the hastily crafted military commission system shows that
being novel and untested comes at a great cost in time, resources and ultimately credibility.").
7. See
Military
Commissions,
ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/issues/nationalsecurity/military-commissions (last visitedJuly 29,2019) (describingthe commissions as "plagued
by excessive secrecy").
8. See David Glazier, Destined for an Epic Fail: The Problematic Guantnamo Military
Commissions, 75 OHIO ST.L.J. 903, 905 (2014) (cataloging a series of the commissions' "failings,"
including "procedural shortcomings," those concerning their "application of substantive law," and
their arguably counterproductive effects on broader U.S. counterterrorism efforts); John G.
Baker, Drinkingfrom a Poisoned Chalice Post-9/11: Defending the Rule ofLaw in the Guantdnamo

Bay Military Commissions, CHAMPION, July 2018, at 35 (in which the Chief Defense Counsel at the
commissions claims that the work of defense counsel has "exposed the GuantInamo Bay Military
Commissions as a failed experiment"); Laura Pitter & W. Paul Smith, Another Blow for Justice in
the Guantanamo Bay Military Commissions, HUM. RT. WATCH (June 29, 2017, 10:30 AM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/29/another-blow-justice-guantanamo-bay-militarycommissions# (calling the commissions "a failed experiment in alternative justice"); Guantdnamo
Bay Detention Camp, ACLU,https://www.aclu.org/issues/national-security/detention/guantanamobay-detention-camp (last visited July 10, 2019) (describing both the military commissions and the
detention center at Guantinamo as "catastrophic failures"); Doubling Down on Failure at
Guantanamo,

AMNESTY

INT'L,

https://www.amnestyusa.org/doubling-down-on-failure-at-

guantanamo (last visited July 10, 2019) ("[T]he reality is that Guantanamo is so broken it can'tbe
fixed-it needs to be condemned and shut down. It is an affront to every American who ever recited
the Pledge of Allegiance and it is ... even by its own terms, a colossal failure."); John Hutson,
Military Commissions Are a Failed Experiment, Try Terror Suspects in Civilian Courts,

POLICY.MIC (Mar. 30, 2012), http://www.policymic.com/debates/6237/military-commissions-area-failed-experiment-try-terror-suspects-in-civilian-courts [http://perma.cc/43PH-3FJM](urgingthe
trial of the 9/11 defendants in civilian court so that "we begin closing the chapter on the failed
military commissions experiment").
9.

Steve Vladeck, It's Time to Admit That Military Commissions Have Failed, LAWFARE

(Apr. 16, 2019, 10:40 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/its-time-admit-military-commissionshave-failed. Vladeck has written extensively on national security issues generally and on the
commissions specifically; his ongoing analysis of developments at the commissions has been
extraordinarily valuable for observers.
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April 2019, the D.C. Circuit held that the trial judge in al-Nashiri's case-Air
Force Colonel Vance Spath-created the appearance of partiality by secretly
negotiating for many months for a job as an immigration judge while presiding
over al-Nashiri's pretrial proceedings. 0 Spath's negotiations with his future
employers in the Department of Justice (DOJ) occurred while the DOJ was
deeply involved in prosecuting the defendant appearing before him. Seeking a
job from one of the parties to a case, the D.C. Circuit held, warranted the vacatur
of all of Judge Spath's rulings in the al-Nashiri case dating back to the point at
which Judge Spath applied to work as an immigration judge."
With one
appellate court's unanimous decision, the case lost hundreds of rulings dating
back to late 2015.12
Even before this latest blow in a marquee prosecution, it would have been
difficult to dispute that the commissions have failed to deliver what many
observers had sought. Collectively, the commissions have proceeded at a
glacial pace since they were first authorized in 2001; despite an estimated cost
of over one billion dollars, they have generated only eight relatively minor
convictions, nearly half of which have not survived appeal. Moreover, the
system itself appears compromised. The commissions have endured a range of
serious criticisms13 and are often seen as fatally flawed or tainted.1 4 Yet the
biggest trials lie ahead. The completed prosecution of al-Nashiri will be
significant, if it ever occurs, but most notable of all would be the trial of the
defendants accused of complicity in the 9/11 attacks, including Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed. Even the 9/11 case remains mired in pretrial proceedings,
however-notwithstanding the fact that that the defendants were arraigned in
2012.15 The trial date in that case is set for January 11, 2021,16 though some
expect that date to give way to further delays. 1 7 It remains conceivable if not

10. See In re al-Nashiri, 921 F.3d 224, 226 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
11. Id. at 241.
12. By one count, the D.C. Circuit's ruling reached approximately 460 of Judge Spath's
written rulings, plus an unspecified number of oral rulings, and at least four published rulings of the
commissions' appellate-level court, the United States Court of Military Commission Review. See
Steve

Targaryen,

First

of

His

Name,

NSL

PODCAST

(Apr.

17,

2019),

https://www.nationalsecuritylawpodcast.com/episode-118-steve-targaryen-first-of-his-name.
13. See supra notes 1-8.
14.

See Guantdnamo Bay Detention

Camp, supra note 8 (describing the military

commissions as "fundamentally broken"); Baker, supra note 8, at 34 (analogizing the commissions

to a "poisoned chalice").
15.

Charlie Savage, At a Hearing, 9/11 Detainees Show Defiance, N.Y. TIMES (May 5,

2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/us/9-11-defendants-face-arraignment-in-militarycourt.html?module=inline.
16.

See Carol Rosenberg, Trialfor Men Accused of Plotting 9/11 Attacks Is Setfor 2021,

N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/30/us/politics/sept-11-trialguantanamo-bay.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage.
17. See, e.g., Steve Vladeck (@steve vladeck), TWITTER (Aug. 30, 2019, 11:30 AM),
https://twitter.com/stevevladeck/status/1167459624913690625 (responding to news of the 9/11
trial date with: "I'm not abetting man, but if I were, I'd put very good money on the 'over"'). There
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likely that the defendants will die in custody, of natural causes, before a final
verdict is rendered.18
Reflecting upon that landscape, surely Vladeck and many others are right:
we have seen enough to know that the commissions are fundamentally
incapable of rendering trustworthy convictions in a timely and transparent
manner, and the commissions will probably never yield meaningful justice in
any broader or more amorphous sense either. Moreover, it is obviously
tempting to evaluate the commissions against that sort of standard-perhaps the
standard one might apply to traditional criminal prosecutions in federal court,
given the salience of Article III courts as an alternative venue for prosecuting
defendants accused of terrorism-related offenses.19
But this consensus approach to evaluating the commissions is mistaken.
Indeed, the commissions have largely succeeded in institutionalizing the norms
behind their creation and behind the War on Terror more broadly. Further,
upending our understanding of the commissions to understand the ways in
which they have "succeeded" is essential to recognizing the greater lessons they
can teach us, both for the War on Terror and for the justice system in general.
To sustain these conclusions, this Article defends two primary, related
propositions.
First, the snags in military commission proceedings that have invited so
much criticism reflect not just the commissions' structural features-their use

is ample reason for skepticism about the trial date. See Carol Rosenberg, Start of Sept. I ITrial in
Doubt After Defense Lawyer Asks to Quit Case, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2020),

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/11/us/politics/911-trial-guantanamo.html (reporting on the
possibility of a delay arising because one defendant's attorney, who "serves in the statutorily
required role of 'learned counsel,"' has requested to leave the case over health issues, and noting
further that the defense teams had long sought-and been denied-funding to retain backup learned
counsel to prevent precisely this sort of delay); Carol Rosenberg, Military Judge in 9/11 Trial at
Guantdnamo
Is
Retiring,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
25,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/25/us/politics/guantanamo-judge-sept-11trial.html#click=https://t.co/c3CAk5mhr (reporting that, in March of 2020, the judge who set the
trial date abruptly announced his resignation from the case, threatening to delay proceedings even
further).
18. See Carol Rosenberg, Guantdnamo Bay as Nursing Home: Military Envisions Hospice
Care

as

Terrorism

Suspects

Age,

N.Y.

TIMES

(Apr.

27,

2019),

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/27/us/politics/guantanamo-bay-aging-terrorism-suspectsmedical-care.html?module=inline (reporting on the U.S. government's efforts to plan for the longterm medical needs of an aging population of forty detainees at the Guantnamo Bay detention
facility-which also houses defendants in ongoing military commission cases-and noting further
that the commission trials have been "inching ahead at a glacial pace").
19.

See generally, Joshua L. Dratel, How ILearnedto Stop Worrying and Love the Military

&

Commissions, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1339 (2011) (extensively comparing the author's experience
litigating criminal cases in Article III courts with his experience representing a defendant at the
military commissions). By one count, there have been over 660 terrorism convictions in Article III
courts between the 9/11 attacks and the middle of 2019. See Tess Bridgeman, Joshua Geltzer
Luke Hartig, Guantdnamo is No Answer-But Here's What Can Work, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 31,
2018), https://wwwjustsecurity.org/60540/guantanamo-answer-but-heres-work.
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of military rather than Article III judges, their peculiar appellate structure, their
evidentiary and secrecy rules, their remote location and sporadic hearing
schedule, and so forth.
Rather, the deeper problem is the pervasive,
questionable judgment by numerous key officials associated with commissions,
including judges at the trial and appellate levels, employees of the DOJ
(including prosecutors and officials within the FBI), employees of the
Department of Defense (DOD) (such as the convening authority of the
commissions, an appointed official), and unidentified intelligence agencies.
Although the structural features of the commissions may facilitate problematic
conduct by key officials, they do not alone explain such conduct. The simpler,
more compelling explanation is that many officials associated with the
commissions simply do not assess the commissions along the same axes as the
public at large. In other words, the commissions suffer from a problem of
culture or ethos, as revealed below by an examination of the circumstances
surrounding the departure of Judge Spath.
The idea that a judicial system can be governed by informal norms-and
not just by formal rules-is not controversial. Indeed, the very notion of the
rule of law turns in substantial part on the norms governing a society as a
whole.20 In some systems, the informal norms may go further in explaining
outcomes than the formal rules.2 1 Moreover, it is widely accepted that discrete
2 3
judicial systems 2 2 or their constituent parts (such as prosecutors' offices)
operate under a mix of formal rules and informal norms. Such norms can derive
from any number of sources. For example, scholars have argued that norms

20.

See Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (June 22, 2016),

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rule-of-law ("The Rule of Law comprises a number of principles
of a formal and procedural character, addressing the way in which a community is governed. The
formal principles concern the generality, clarity, publicity, stability, and prospectivity of the norms

that govern a society.").
21.

See David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and

Condones Unlawful DisclosuresofInformation, 127 HARV.L. REV. 512,515 (2013) (exploring the
subtle norms governing the leaking of classified information from within the U.S. federal
government and observing that "the statutes on the books concerning leaks, and the political rhetoric

associated with them, are so harsh, and yet the government's actual treatment of the activity seems
to have been so mild. There is a dramatic disconnect between the way our laws and our leaders
purport to condemn leaking and the way they have condoned it-a rampant, pervasive culture of

it-in practice.").
22. See John F. Padgett, PleaBargainingand Prohibitionin the Federal Courts, 1908-1934,
24 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 413,414-15 (1990) (arguing that, "judges appointed through bar association
sponsorship may be harsher and more routinized in their sentencing than judges elected through
sponsorship by political machines" and therefore that "[h]istorically, the local legal culture of the
federal courts differed sharply from contemporaneous state and county criminal courts precisely on

[norms of] professionalism" as manifested in the practice of accepting plea bargains from criminal
defendants).
23. See generally Todd A. Berger, The Ethical Limits ofDiscrediting the Truthful Witness:
How Modern Ethics Rules Fail to Prevent Truthful Witnesses from Being Discredited Through

UnethicalMeans, 99 MARQ. L. REV. 283 (2015) (referring bothto the culture ofprosecutor's offices
and of criminal defense lawyering generally).
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borrowed from a particular legal domain 24 or from broader, exogenous
sociopolitical forceS 2 5 can operate in the background to influence judicial
decision-making. Whether the norms are good ones (morally, practically, or on
any other metric) is a separate question, although this Article argues that the
norms governing the military commissions are bad on multiple metrics.
The second proposition defended below is that, although the ethos of the
commissions deviates sharply from the one we typically associate with fair
trials, its presence at the commissions is neither surprising nor, strictly speaking,
a failure of the commissions. Indeed, it was injected into the commissions
deliberately from the outset. The commissions are in significant part designed
to serve as a less favorable venue for their defendants than traditional civilian
courts. The sentiment behind that feature is consistent with other elements of
the War on Terror-including the closely-linked policies behind the United
States' treatment of detainees. As a result, the commissions are best understood
as another prong in the broader War on Terror, not a separate, isolated
experiment dedicated to seeking justice above all else. The traditional indicia
of fairness and efficiency (or even the perceptions of fairness and efficiency)
were never at the center of the military commissions project. The commissions
very much bear the mark of their maker, and, this Article argues, have
succeeded in achieving much of what they were designed to achieve.
These propositions have significant implications because they force us to
overturn our traditional understanding of the commissions. In doing so, they
reveal new lessons about the perils of creating a trial system from scratch, the
genesis and ongoing significance of the norms that govern those systems, and
the inability of the commissions to render reliable results. The first Section of
this Article offers a brief description of the relevant history and structure of the
commissions. Section II recounts the dramatic story of Judge Spath's exit from
the commissions and the litigation that followed to argue that commission
proceedings evince a pervasive and problematic ethos. Section III explores the
historical basis for concluding that, nevertheless, the commissions are achieving
the goals that key officials long intended. Finally, Section IV teases out the
implications of accepting this view of the commissions.

24.

See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom

Constitutional Norms

and Statutory Interpretation, 100

YALE L.J.

545,

561

(1990)

("[Constitutional] norms operate indirectly, by serving as the unstated background context that
informs

our interpretation

of statutes

and other subconstitutional

texts. In other words,

contemporary constitutional law is a significant element of the legal culture that judges inevitably,

if often subconsciously, absorb and rely upon when acting in their judicial capacity, including those

instances in which they engage in statutory interpretation.").
25. See Suni Cho, Post-Racialism,94 IowA L. REV. 1589, 1605-09 (2009) (arguing that,
before the Civil Rights Era, American courts institutionalized bias against people of color by
deploying "seemingly neutral strategies to disenfranchise peoples of color in lockstep with
sociopolitical forces that sought to restore the South's honor").
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26

Military commissions are a distinct form of tribunal, "neither mentioned

in the Constitution nor created by statute," that are "born of military
necessity." 2 7 The resort to military commissions is not without precedent in the
United States. The United States has historically utilized such commissions in

three situations: in place of civilian courts when martial law was in effect; "as
part of a temporary military government over occupied enemy territory or
territory regained from an enemy where civilian government cannot and does
not function"; 2 8and "as an 'incident to the conduct of war' when there is need
'to seize and subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who . . have
violated the law of war.'29 Perhaps most famous for the Supreme Court cases
they generated, the United States utilized military commissions during the Civil
War 3 0 and to prosecute Nazi saboteurs in 1942.31 Officials within the DOJ drew
on parts of that history in recommending the creation of the present

commissions after 9/11,32 which represent the third variety described above. 33
The Guantinamo Bay commissions have proceeded roughly in three
phases. The initial phase began formally when the commissions first originated,
via an executive order signed by President Bush on November 13, 2001.34 Bush
created the commissions explicitly as an emergency response to the attacks on

9/11.35 Per his executive order, the commissions were designed to try non-U.S.
citizenS36 whom the President deemed to have a particular connection to

26.

Others have written insignificant detail about the history of military commissions in the

United States and the structure of the current commissions at Guantinamo Bay. See generally,
Glazier, supra note 8; JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL41163, THE MILITARY
COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2009 (MCA 2009): OVERVIEW AND LEGAL ISSUES (2014); STEPHEN DYCUS

ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 1161-97 (Wolters Kluwer, 6th ed. 2016). This Section provides
the basic history necessary to support the argumentation that follows.

27.
28.

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 590 (2006).
Id. at595-96 (quoting Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304,314 (1946)) (identifying

these as two of the three categories encompassing the historical use of military commissions in the
United States).

29.

Id. at 596 (quoting Ex parte Quirn, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)) (identifying this as the third

category encompassing the historical use of military commissions in the United States).

30. See Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
31. SeeExparteQuirin,317U.S.1(1942).
32. See generally Legality of the Use of Military Comm'ns to Try Terrorists, 25 Op. O.L.C.
238(2001).
33. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 597 (noting and approving of the government's use of previous
law-of-war commissions as precedent for the commissions at Guantinamo Bay).
34.

See Press Release, President George W. Bush, President Issues Military Order (Nov. 13,

2001),
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011113-27.html;
see also Barton Gellman & Jo Becker, A Different Understandingwith the President,WASH. POST
(June 24, 2007) http://voices.washingtonpost.com/cheney/chapters/chapter_1
genesis of the executive order).
35.

See Press Release, supra, note 34,

36.

See id.

2(a).

1(a)-(b), (g).

(describing the
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international terrorism. 7Although reasonably short, the order laid out some of
the formal features of the commissions that have been the subject of criticism
by observers. For example, it announced Bush's "finding":
Given the danger to the safety of the United States and the nature of
international terrorism . .. it is not practicable to apply in military
commissions under this order the principles of law and the rules of
evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the
United States district courts.3 8
The order designated the commissions a "military function," 3 9 and
therefore control over the defendants and proceedings-including the creation
of governing regulations-fell to the Secretary of Defense.4 0
The order
nevertheless specified that detainees should be treated humanely, 4 1 and that the
commissions would provide for a "full and fair trial, with the military
commission sitting as the triers of both fact and law."4 2 In addition to providing
several additional stipulations concerning items such as conviction and
sentencing, 4 3the order offered several important parameters. First, it noted that
defendants could be "tried . . for any and all offenses triable by military
commission." 44 It also explicitly stated that life imprisonment and death were
among the sentences available, 4 5 and it decreed that individuals subject to the
order could not "seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or
indirectly . .. in (i) any court of the United States, or any State thereof, (ii) any
46
court of any foreign nation, or (iii) any international tribunal."
Under this order, the United States initiated commission proceedings
against four defendants in 2004.47 One of those defendants, Salim Ahmed
Hamdan, challenged the lawfulness of the commissions via a habeas petition. 48
That challenge ultimately reached the Supreme Court, which sided with

37. See id.
2(a)(1). The order allowed the President to determine which qualifying
individuals it would be in the interest of the United States to try by military commission and to
exempt qualifying individuals who did not meet that test. See id.

38.
39.

Id. 1(f).
Id. 4(b).

40.

Id.

2(a)(2).

2(b)-(c), 3-4. The DOD first issued procedures for commission trials on March

21, 2002. See Memorandum from Timothy H. Edgar, ACLU Legislative Counsel, regarding the
"Military Commission Order No. 1" (April 16, 2002), https://www.aclu.org/other/interestedpersons-memorandum-regarding-military-commission-order-no-1.
41. See Press Release, supra note 34, 3(b).
42. Id. 4(c)(2).
43. See generally id. 4.
44. Id. 4(a).
45. Id.
46. Id. §7(b)(2).
47. DYcus ET AL., supra note 26, at 1175.
48. See id. at 1175-76 (summarizing the Hamdan decision and its implications for the
commissions).

10

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 34

Hamdan in late June of 2006.49 As noted above, the commissions had been
created by executive order, without explicit congressional authorization, which
left them vulnerable to challenge on statutory grounds. The Court indeed found
that the commissions violated both the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ) (a federal statute) and the Geneva Conventions (which indisputably
constitute part of the law of war, compliance with which is a predicate for the
exercise of non-court-martial jurisdiction under the UCMJo).5 1 In so holding,

49.

See generally Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); see also DYcus ETAL., supra

note 26, at 1175 (providing some background to Hamdan).
50. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 628 ("For, regardless of the nature of the rights conferred on
Hamdan, [the Geneva Conventions] are, as the Government does not dispute, part of the law of war.
And compliance with the law of war is the condition upon which the authority set forth in Article

21 [of the UCMJ] is granted.") (citations omitted).
51. Specifically, the Court held that commissions violated Articles 21 and 36 of the UCMJ
and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 612-13 ("These
simply are not the circumstances in which, by any stretch of the historical evidence or this Court's
precedents, a military commission established by Executive Order under the authority of Article 21

of the UCMJ may lawfully try a person and subject him to punishment."); id. at 624 ("Under the
circumstances, then, the rules applicable in courts-martial must apply. Since it is undisputed that
Commission Order No. 1 deviates in many significant respects from those rules, it necessarily
violates Article 36(b)."); id. at 625 ("The procedures adopted to try Hamdan also violate the Geneva

Conventions.").
Under Article 21 of the UCMJ, military commissions could be used to try defendants for
violations of the laws of war; but Hamdan was charged, inter alia, with standalone conspiracy,
which was not at the time a war crime. See id. at 612 ("Hamdan is charged not with an overt act for
which he was caught redhanded in a theater of war and which military efficiency demands be tried
expeditiously, but with an agreement the inception of which long predated the attacks of September
11, 2001, and the AUMF. That may well be a crime, but it is not an offense that 'by the law of war
may be tried by military commissio[n]."') (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting 10
U.S.C. 821 (2018)); see also DYCUS ET AL., supra note 26, at 1175 (offering a brief summary of
the Hamdan ruling as concerns Article 21 of the UCMJ).
Article 36 of the UCMJ required that the rules governing trials held at military commissions
be "the same as those applied to courts-martial unless such uniformity proves impracticable."
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 620. The first phase of the commissions indisputably deviated in myriad ways
from court-martial proceedings. According to the Court, the President had not made an official
determination that operating the commissions in accordance with court-martial rules was
impractical. Moreover, the Court found that the record did not independently support the conclusion
that conforming the commissions to courts-martial was impractical. Therefore, the rules governing
the commissions were illegal. Id. at 620-24.
As for the Geneva Conventions, the fullest restrictions of the laws of war apply to

"international armed conflicts," and more limited restrictions apply in "non-international armed
conflicts." See Glazier, supra note 8, at 906 ("All Guantinamo charges fail to distinguish between
the robust set of international armed conflict rules and the lesser set of non-international conflict
regulations even while the government generally holds itself accountable only for complying with
the latter."). The United States' positionwas thatthe conflict with al Qaeda fell into neither of these
categories and therefore that the Geneva Conventions were inapplicable. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at
628, 630 ("The conflict with al Qaeda is not, according to the Government, [an international armed
conflict] to whichthe full protections afforded detainees underthe 1949 Geneva Conventions apply"
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the Supreme Court ensured that the original model of the Guantinamo Bay
Military Commissions could not continue, and so ended their first phase.52
President Bush publicly characterized the Hamdan ruling as an
endorsement of his view that it was appropriate to try defendants accused of
terrorism offenses before military commissions with the qualification that the
commissions should be authorized specifically by Congress.5 3 Within three
months, he sent legislation to Congress that would revive the commissions.5 4 In
remarks announcing that legislation, given in early September of 2006, he
identified the changes to the commissions that he sought to establish through
legislation:
First, I'm asking Congress to list the specific, recognizable offenses
that would be considered crimes under the War Crimes Act -- so our
personnel can know clearly what is prohibited in the handling of

and "the Government [further] asserts, that Common Article 3 [governing non-international armed

conflicts] does not apply to Hamdan [either].").
The D.C. Circuit had accepted that view below. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 41-42
(D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). But the Supreme Court disagreed and held that the
United States and al Qaeda are engaged in a non-international armed conflict. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at
630. As a result, the restrictions of Common Article 3 apply. Id. at 631. One of those restrictions
requires that individuals detained in such a conflict are entitled to have "the passing of sentences
and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted
court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples." Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. The Court held that Hamdan's commission was not a "regularly
constituted court" because the government had demonstrated no practical need to deviate to the
extent that it had from typical court-martial practices. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 632-33.
52. The Hamdan Court also expressed concern about the evidentiary rules governing the
first phase of the commissions, which bears on the analysis below. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 61415 ("Another striking feature of the rules governing Hamdan's commission is that they permit the
admission of any evidence that, in the opinion of the presiding officer, 'would have probative value
to a reasonable person.' Under this test, not only is testimonial hearsay and evidence obtained
through coercion fully admissible, but neither live testimony nor witnesses' written statements need
be sworn. Moreover, the accused and his civilian counsel may be denied access to evidence in the
form of 'protected information' (which includes classified information as well as 'information
protected by law or rule from unauthorized disclosure' and 'information concerning other national
security interests'), so long as the presiding officer concludes that the evidence is 'probative' under
§6(D)(1) and that its admission without the accused's knowledge would not 'result in the denial of
a full and fair trial.' Finally, a presiding officer's determination that evidence 'would [not] have
probative value to a reasonable person' may be overridden by a majority of the other commission
members.") (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
53. See Press Release, President George W. Bush, President Discusses Creation of Military
Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists (Sept. 6, 2006), https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html
("The Supreme Court [in
Hamdan] determined that military commissions are an appropriate venue for trying terrorists, but
ruled that military commissions needed to be explicitly authorizedby the United States Congress.").
54. See id. ("So today, I'm sending Congress legislationto specifically authorize the creation
of military commissions to try terrorists for war crimes."). Hamdan was decided on June 29, 2006.
See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 557.
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terrorist enemies. Second, I'm asking that Congress make explicit
that by following the standards of the Detainee Treatment Act our
personnel are fulfilling America's obligations under Common
Article Three of the Geneva Conventions. Third, I'm asking that
Congress make it clear that captured terrorists cannot use the Geneva
Conventions as a basis to sue our personnel in courts -- in U.S.
courts.55
The first two of these changes were plainly designed to blunt the concerns
expressed by the Hamdan Court.
Approximately one month later, in October of 2006, President Bush
signed the legislation in question, the Military Commissions Act (MCA) of
2006.56 Bush then reconstituted the commissions in February of 2007 when he
issued Executive Order 13425.57 Thus began the second phase of the military
commissions. Fundamentally, the MCA of 2006 provided statutory authority
for the commissions to "try alien unlawful enemy combatants engaged in
hostilities against the United States for violations of the law of war and other
offenses triable by military commission." 5 The MCA of 2006 also established
an appellate structure for the commissions-first by directing the Secretary of
Defense to create the Court of Military Commission Review (CMCR), an
Article I appellate court utilizing panels of at minimum three military judges, 59
and second by stipulating that appeals from the CMCR would go to the D.C.
Circuit, 6 0 with the Supreme Court empowered to review final judgments of the
D.C. Circuit by writ of certiorari.6 1
Additionally, the MCA of 2006 provided several procedural and
evidentiary rules for the commissions, such as permitting the admission of
certain hearsay evidence 6 2 and evidence obtained through coercion.6 3 The
statute also identified twenty-eight triable offenses.6 4 Those offenses included
traditional violations of the law of war (such as attacking civilians or inflicting
torture), but also offenses that did not meet that criterion (such as conspiracy
and providing material support for terrorism).6 5
55.

See Press Release, supra note 53.

56. See Press Release, President George W. Bush, President Bush Signs Military
Commissions
Act
of
2006
(Oct.
17,
2006),
https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061017-1.html.
57.

See ELSEA, supra note 26.

58. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366,
2602(2006).
59. See 10U.S.C. §950f(2018).

948b(a), 120 Stat. 2600,

60. See id. 950d; see also DYcus ET AL., supra note 26, at 1176 (describing the relevant
commission structure).

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See
See
See
See
See

10 U.S.C. § 950g(d).
id. 949a(b)(3)(D).
id.
949a(b)(3)(B), 948r.
id. 950v.
§ 950v(2), (17), (25), (28); see also DYCUS ET AL., supra note 26, at 1177 ("Some

of the offenses defined by the MCA, such as perfidy and attacking protected targets, are clearly
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Under the MCA of 2006, the commissions fully prosecuted three
defendants. 6 6 Additionally, by the time President Obama took office in January
of 2009, "charges were pending against 13 defendants and had been sworn in
an additional nine cases." 6 7 Because of statements made during his presidential
campaign, many expected Obama to shut down the commissions altogether. 68
Instead, however, on May 15, 2009, Obama paused ongoing proceedings to
"reform the military commission process," 6 9 thus ending the second phase of
the commissions. Obama sought several specific rule changes:
The rule changes will ensure that: First, statements that have been
obtained from detainees using cruel, inhuman and degrading
interrogation methods will no longer be admitted as evidence at trial.
Second, the use of hearsay will be limited, so that the burden will no
longer be on the party who objects to hearsay to disprove its
reliability. Third, the accused will have greater latitude in selecting
their counsel. Fourth, basic protections will be provided for those
who refuse to testify. And fifth, military commission judges may
establish the jurisdiction of their own courts.7 0
Obama argued that these changes would "begin to restore the Commissions as
a legitimate forum for prosecution, while bringing them in line with the rule of
law." 7 1

recognized as international war crimes..... Others, such as inchoate conspiracy and 'providing
material support to terrorism,' are not nearly as well established as international offenses, as four
Justices emphasized with respect to conspiracy in Hamdan.") In fact, offenses in the latter category
"have formed the basis for most of the post-MCA military commission prosecutions." Id.
66. See Glazier, supra note 8, at 911; see also Press Release, President Barack Obama,
Statement of President Barack Obama on Military Commissions (May 15, 2009),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-barack-obamamilitary-commissions (asserting, as of May 15, 2009, "the system of Military Commissions at
Guantnamo Bay had only succeeded in prosecuting three suspected terrorists in more than seven
years"). For a brief discussion of some of these specific commission proceedings, see Glazier, supra
note 8, at 911-12.
67. The Guantanamo Trials, HUM. RTs. WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/guantanamo-trials
(last updated Aug. 9, 2018).
68. See id. Relatedly, in January of 2009, President Obama also issued an executive order
directing the closure of the detention facility at Guantinamo Bay, although that result never
materialized. See ELSEA, supra note 26. At one point, President Obama and Attorney General Eric
Holder decided to move the trial of the 9/11 defendants from the military commissions to an Article
III court in New York, but they rescinded that decision two years later due to political opposition.
See Charlie Savage, In a Reversal, Military Trialsfor 9/11 Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/05/us/05gitmo.html (detailing the decision made in 2011 to
backtrack and continue with trying the 9/11 defendants before a military commission).
69. Press Release, supra note 66 ("Today, the Department of Defense will be seeking
additional continuances in several pending military commission proceedings. We will seek more
time to allow us time to reform the military commission process.").
70. Id.
7 1. Id.
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Several months later, in October of 2009, President Obama signed those
revisions into law with the MCA of 2009, which was part of the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2010.72 The MCA of 2009 modified the
language defining commission jurisdiction, providing for the trial by
commission of any "alien unprivileged enemy belligerent."7 3 Among other
changes, it also strengthened some of the rights of commission defendants, such
as by imposing new limits on hearsay evidence7 4 and evidence derived from
coercion, 7 5 improving access of defendants to evidence and witnesses,76 and, for
the first time, requiring that defendants facing the death penalty be appointed
experienced capital defense attorneys. 77 Additionally, under the MCA of 2009,
the CMCR became the United States Court of Military Commission Review
(USCMCR), and gained broader scope of appellate review over trial
proceedings. 78 The D.C. Circuit also gained a broader scope of appellate
review, now comprising all "matters of law, including the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the verdict." 7 9 With some minor changes, the regime set in
place by the MCA of 2009 continues to govern today.so
The current military commissions at Guantinamo Bay thus operate under
the auspices of the DOD, per a statutory framework largely instituted under the
Bush administration in 2006 and modified in nontrivial ways under the Obama
administration in 2009. They are managed primarily by the Office of the

72.

See Press Release, President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the Signing of

the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Oct. 28, 2009),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/realitycheck/the-press-office/remarks-president-signingnational-defense-authorization-act-fiscal-year-2010 (announcing the signing of the NDAA);
Warren Richey, Obama Endorses Military Commissions for Guantnamo Detainees, CHRISTIAN
SC. MONITOR (Oct. 29, 2009), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2009/1029/p02s01usju.html (noting that the signing of the NDAA included the signing of the MCA of 2009); see also

ELSEA, supra note 26 (describing the MCA of 2009 as part of the NDAA of 2010).
73. See 10 U.S.C. § 948c (2018).
74. See id. 949a(b)(3)(D).
75. See id. 948r.
76. See id. 949j.
77. See id. 949a(b)(2)(C)(ii); see generally President Obama Signs Military Commissions
Changes into Law, ACLU (Oct. 28, 2009), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/president-obamasigns-military-commissions-changes-law. For a detailed comparison of the provisions of the MCA
of 2006 and the provisions of MCA of 2009, see ELSEA, supra note 26, at 36-38.
78.

Steve Vladeck, A Guide to Appellate and Collateral Review Under the Military

Commissions Acts, LAWFARE (Apr. 4, 2013, 2:42 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/guideappellate-and-collateral-review-under-military-commissions-acts.
79.

Id. (quoting National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-

84 950g(d), 123 Stat. 2190, 2604 (2009)).
80.

See U.S. Court of Military Commission Review (USCMCR)

History, OFF. MIL.

COMMISSIONS, https://www.mc.mil/ABOUTUSUSCMCRHistory.aspx (last visitedMay 18,2020)
(noting that the MCA of2009 was amended in 2011 and 2013). For a list of some of these changes,
see

CHANGES

TO

MILITARY

COMMISSIONS

ACT

OF

2009

FROM

2010

To

2013,

https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/Changes%20to%20Military%20Commission%2OAct%20from

%202010%20to%202013.pdf (last visited July 14, 2019).
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Convening Authority, which is housed within the DOD and "is empowered to
convene military commissions, refer charges to trial, negotiate pre-trial
agreements, and review records of trial."" The convening authority reports to
the Secretary of Defense and his or her deputy.8 2 The commission structure also
includes an Office of the Chief Prosecutor and a Military Commissions Defense
Organization (MCDO). The prosecution teams include staff from the U.S.
Armed Forces, the DOD, and the DOJ. The defense teams feature a
combination of military and civilian attorneys, including "learned" capital
defense counsel in capital cases.
The Secretary of Defense appoints a chief judge of the Military
Commissions Trial Judiciary, and that judge then details a trial judge (drawn
from the military judges who oversee court-martial proceedings) to each case
that the convening authority refers for trial.8 3 The Secretary of Defense may
directly appoint judges from the Courts of Criminal Appeals for the different
branches of the military to the USCMCR.8 4 Under the MCA of 2009, the
President may also appoint civilian judges to the USCMCR with the advice and
consent of the Senate. 5 Since June of 2015, all judges nominated to the
USCMCR have been approved by the Senate.8 6 As of May of 2020, the
USCMCR comprised nine judges.8 7
Appeals from the judgments of the USCMCR flow to the D.C. Circuit,
but, in 2008, the D.C. Circuit held that it "lacked jurisdiction under the MCA to
entertain a military commission defendant's direct appeal from anything other
than a 'final judgment' reviewed by the [US]CMCR.""
In 2015, the D.C.

81.

Organization

Overview,

OFF.

https://www.mc.mil/ABOUTUS/OrganizationOverview.aspx

MIL.

COMMISSIONS,

(last visited May 18, 2020).

82. See Office ofMilitary Commissions Organizational Chart (High Level), OFF. MIL.
COMMISSIONS, https://www.mc.miil/ABOUTUS/OrganizationOverview/OrganizationalChart.aspx
(last visited May 18, 2020); see also Daniel Uria, Pentagon: Two Top Guantanamo Bay Officials

Fired, UPI (Feb. 26,2018,12:08 AM), https://www.upi.com/TopNews/US/2018/02/06/PentagonTwo-top-Guantanamo-Bay-officials-fired/5441517891086/ (describing the firing of a convening
authority and the appointment of an acting successor, both by the Secretary of Defense).
83.

See

How

Military

Commissions

Work,

OFF.

MIL.

COMMISSIONS,

https://www.mc.mil/ABOUTUS.aspx (last visited May 18,2020).
84.

See U.S. Court ofMilitary Commission Review (CMCR) History, OFFICE OF MILITARY

COMMISSIONS,

https://www.mc.mil/ABOUTUS/USCMCRHistory.aspx

(last visited July

14,

2019).
85. See id.
86. See Steve Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit's Passive-Aggressive Approach to Military
Commission Mandamus, LAWFARE (July 31, 2017, 10:30 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/dccircuits-passive-aggressive-approach-military-commission-mandamus; see generally Khadr v.
United States, 529 F.3d 1112 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (providing the holding in question).
87.

Judges U.S. CourtofMilitary Commission Review, OFFICE OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS,

https://www.mc.mil/ABOUTUS/USCMCRJudges.aspx (last visited May 18, 2020).
88. Steve Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit'sMandamus Jurisdiction and the Legitimacy of the
Military Commissions, LAWFARE (Dec. 7, 2014, 11:10 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/dccircuits-mandamus-jurisdiction-and-legitimacy-military-commissions. Parties may then petition for
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Circuit held that it does, however, possess jurisdiction to issue writs of
mandamus directed to the USCMCR.8 9 The D.C. Circuit's standard for a
successful petition for a writ of mandamus requires the petitioner to demonstrate
clear error by the court below. 90 This pair of rulings has effectively constricted
the range of issues from the commissions that reaches Article III courts: rather
than a typical range of interlocutory appeals, petitioners from decisions of the
USCMCR can raise only collateral challenges to clearly erroneous rulings-a
standard that may be particularly difficult to meet because so many questions
arising from the commissions are novel and assessed as a matter of first
impression. 91
As of May of 2020, six cases were designated "active" on the commission
docket, 92 but in essence there are three contested cases ongoing: 93 the 9/11 case,
the case against al-Nashiri, and a case against Abd al Hadi al Iraqi. 94 All three
remain in pretrial proceedings. 9 5 Hearings for each case typically occur for no
more than one week per month; most of the relevant participants (including the
judges, the prosecutors, and the defense attorneys) travel to Guantinamo Bay
on military flights from Andrews Air Force Base on the weekend before the
hearings and return the following weekend. 96 The remote location of the
commissions is one reason for the delays and cost inefficiencies that have
characterized the proceedings thus far.

a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. See Glazier, supra note 8, at 907 (describing the Supreme

Court's denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari for a convicted commission defendant).
89. See Vladeck, supra note 86; see generally In re al-Nashiri, 791 F.3d 71, 75 (D.C. Cir.
2015) (providing the holding).
90.

See Vladeck, supra note 86; see also In re al-Nashiri, 791 F.3d at 86.

91. See Vladeck, supra note 86 (discussing the D.C. Circuit's approach to granting
mandamus relief, which has at times disadvantaged petitioners raising questions of first impression).
92.

See Cases, OFF. MIL. COMMISSIONS, https://www.mc.mil/CASES.aspx (refine search by

"Charges Pending/Active").
93. See Vladeck, supra note 9 (offering some background).
94. Two of the six cases relate to ongoing proceedings for guilty pleas that have already
been accepted, and two separate cases are tied to the 9/11 attacks. See Cases, supra note 92 (refine
searchby "Charges Pending/Active"). The case against al Hadi is the only one of these three that is
not capital. See Carol Rosenberg, War Crimes Trial of an Alleged al-Qaida Commander at
Guantdnamo
Bay,
MIAMI
HERALD
(Nov.
11,
2016,
4:00
PM),

https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/guantanamo/articlell4204098.html ("Hadi is charged in what is currently
the only contested non-capital case at Guantanamo.").
95. See id.
96.

See Alex Sinha, Government Attempt to Speed up Guantnamo Trials (Rightfully)

Backfires, ACLU (March 2, 2015, 4:15 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/speakeasy/governmentattempt-speed-guantanamo-trials-rightfully-backfires (noting that the judges do not reside in
Guantnamo Bay); Carol Rosenberg, The Cost of Running Guantdnamo Bay: $13 Million Per

Prisoner,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
16,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/16/us/politics/guantanamo-bay-costprison.html#click=https://t.co/CGa9XnAlTy ("Judges, lawyers, journalists and support workers are
flown in and out [of Guantinamo] on weekly shuttles.").

2020] THE CYNICAL SUCCESSES OF GUANTANAMO BAY MILITARY COMMISSIONS

17

According to Vladeck, in the roughly eighteen years since the start of their
first phase, the commissions have generated a total of eight convictions. 9 7 Six
of those convictions were the result of plea bargains, and half of those six were
later vacated on appeal. 9 8 In fact, applying its "plain error" mandamus standard,
the D.C. Circuit discarded two of the three charges in the solitary commission
conviction that has survived a post-conviction appeal.99 The precise financial
costs of obtaining this handful of convictions is difficult to ascertain. Per the
Department of Defense, from 2007 to 2013, the commissions cost $600
million.10 0 Estimates place the total cost for the life of the commissions in
excess of one billion dollars.10 1
The cost-per-conviction ratio for the
commissions is therefore exceptionally high, providing another basis for
concern among observers.
II. JUDGE SPATH's DEPARTURE FROM THEAL-NASHIRICASE
The performance of the commissions to date plainly justifies objections
from observers about efficiency and effectiveness. It is undeniable that the
commissions have not brought terrorism suspects to justice in impressive
numbers or with impressive speed, and the commissions' performance
unsurprisingly fails the standard that many observers apply. 01 2 In that

97. See Vladeck, supra note 9.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See Zak Newman, $600Million and Counting: GTMO'sMilitary Commissions, ACLU
(Oct. 24, 2013, 6:42 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/detention/600-million-andcounting-gtmos-military-commissions.
101. See DYcus ET AL., supra note 26, at 1195. It is difficult to separate the cost of
maintaining the detention facility from the cost of maintaining the court system, and the virtues of
doing so are somewhat limited because the two are linked in operation, even though many of the
detainees are not defendants in commission cases. In 2019, the New York Times estimated the
cumulative cost of maintaining both the prison and court system from its inception at over seven
billion dollars. See Rosenberg, supra note 96 ("A Defense Department report in 2013 calculated the
annual cost of operating Guantanamo Bay's prison and court system at $454.1 million, or nearly
$90 million less than last year. At the time, there were 166 prisoners at Guantinamo, making the
per-prisoner cost $2.7 million. The 2013 report put the total cost of building and operating the prison
since 2002 at $5.2 billion through 2014, a figure that now appears to have risen to past $7 billion.").
102. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 8, at 35 (noting that, as head of the MCDO, John Baker is
"frequently asked why these trials are taking so long" and that "[flor many, delay is the biggest
concern."). Of course, as noted above, there have been some convictions at the commissions, and
one might point to the handling of those cases as limited evidence of the effectiveness of the
commissions at fulfilling their ostensible purpose. For example, in 2016, sitting en bane and
applying a "plain error" standard, the D.C. Circuit upheld the commission's conspiracy conviction
ofAli Hamza al Bahlul (after the D.C. Circuit's panel had previously vacated the conviction). See
Helen Klein Murillo & Alex Loomis, A Summary of the al Bahlul Decision, LAWFARE (Oct. 21,
2016, 9:39 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/summary-al-bahlul-decision; Bahlul v. United
States, 840 F.3d 757 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Peter Margulies has argued that the Bahlul decision in fact
reinforced the legitimacy of the commissions. See Peter Margulies, The D.C. Circuit's En Banc
Decision in Bahlul: Sui Generis or Guidance for Future Military Commissions?, LAWFARE (Oct.
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connection, it is especially notable that the commissions have endured revisions
to address some of their structural issues, such as being bolstered by
congressional authorization and undergoing upgrades to the evidentiary rules
that began as very unfavorable to the defendants. 10 3 Indeed, Chief Prosecutor
of the Military Commissions, Brigadier General Mark Martins, has claimed that
a careful comparison of the third phase of the commissions with civilian courts
reveals that "procedural differences in protections [for the defendants]
are . . slight.""
If anything, the arc of the commissions arguably bends
toward conformity with court-martial proceedings.o
In theory, these changes should "improve" the performance of the
commissions by blunting the concerns of critics and by diminishing the
dimensions of the commissions that are subject to novel legal challenges
(thereby potentially accelerating proceedings). But it is far from clear that the
performance of the commissions has improved in any meaningful way even as
their formal features have become more similar to those of fair or regular trials.
The salient explanation is that the formal features of the commissions are not,
in fact, the primary impediment to swift, secure and (reasonably) numerous
convictions. An evaluation of the circumstances surrounding the departure of
Judge Spath from the commissions trial of al-Nashiri helps reveal that that a
deeper problem with the commissions is their prevailing ethos.
A. al-Nashiri'sTrial-Level Proceedings
Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri was detained in 2002106 and held for years in
CIA custody, where he was tortured as part of the CIA's "Enhanced

21,

2016,

3:51

PM),

https://www.lawfareblog.com/dc-circuits-en-banc-decision-bahlul-sui-

generis-or-guidance-future-military-commissions ("The en banc D.C. Circuit's affirmance of the
military commission conviction of Ali Hamza al Bahlul for conspiracy ... solidifies the legitimacy

of commissions in U.S. counterterrorism law and policy."). Steve Vladeck took a very different
view. See Steve Vladeck, Al Bahlul and the Long Shadow ofIllegitimacy, LAWFARE (Oct. 22,2016,
9:59 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/al-bahlul-and-long-shadow-illegitimacy

(describing the

judges' opinions inBahlul as "surprisingly sloppy" and describing as "mind-boggling" Margulies's
assertion that the Bahlul ruling "solidifies the legitimacy of the commissions") (quoting Vladeck,
supra). Controversy aside, it is consistent with the view defended here that a handful of convictions
have survived appeal, especially (but by no means only) because a number have not. See, e.g.,

Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled by al Bahlul v. United States,
767 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
103.

See supra note 52 (describing some of the original evidentiary rules).

104.

Benjamin Wittes, Mark Martins Address to the New York City Bar, LAWFARE (Jan. 10,

2012, 6:30 PM) (quoting Brigadier General Mark Martins), https://www.lawfareblog.com/markmartins-address-new-york-city-bar.
105. See Vladeck, supra note 78 (arguing that "the purpose of the 2009 MCA was to align
appellate review of the commissions with that available in courts-martial").
106. USS
Cole
Bombing
Fast
Facts,
CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2013/09/18/world/meast/uss-cole-bombing-fast-facts/index.html
(last
updated Mar. 27, 2019, 8:12 PM).
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Interrogation Program." 1 0 7 He was transferred to Guantinamo in 2006,10 and
his case was referred for trial before a military commission in 2008.109 He
stands accused of orchestrating the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in October of
2000 as it was docked in a harbor in Yemen, killing 17 and wounding 39
more. 1 10 He has also been accused of attempting an attack on the U.S.S. The
Sullivans (also in 2000) and of coordinating an attack on a French oil tanker in
2002."' The government withdrew its charges against him in 2009112 and
reinstated charges in 2011.113 As noted above, this second pass at trying alNashiri remains in the pre-trial phase as of February of 2020.
Air Force Colonel Vance Spath joined the al-Nashiri case in the summer
of 2014, presiding until the summer of 2018, when he departed to become an
immigration judge. 114 He was therefore not the first judge to preside over alNashiri's commission proceedings. Unbeknownst to al-Nashiri and his defense
team, however, Judge Spath began the process of applying to become an
immigration judge in November of 2015, approximately a year and a half after
he began overseeing al-Nashiri's case. 115 Judge Spath in fact received an offer
to become an immigration judge in March of 2017, but extended negotiations
about a mutually acceptable start date continued into early 2018-again, all
without the knowledge of al-Nashiri and his defense team. Thus, for a
substantial majority of the time during which he was the judge in that case,
Judge Spath was either secretly pursuing employment within the DOJ or

107. See Charlie Savage, CI.A. Torture Left Scars on GuantanamoPrisoner'sPsyche for
Years, N.Y.TIMES (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/17/us/politics/guantanamo-

bay-abd-al-rahim-al-nashiri.html ("It has long been known that the C.I.A. subjected Mr. Nashiri to
some ofthe most extreme torture ofany prisoner taken into the agency's custody after the terrorist
attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. That included prolonged sleep deprivation and the suffocation technique
called waterboarding, both of which the Justice Department deemed lawful. It also included a mock
execution by an interrogator who racked the slide of a pistol as ifpreparing to fire it and then revved

a power drill next to his head, which went beyond the approved program.").
108.

See USS Cole Bombing Fast Facts, supra note 106.

109.

See id.

110. See id. Because this bombing predated the 9/11 attacks, and therefore arguably predated
a state of war with al Qaeda, at one point al-Nashiri sought a writ of mandamus "to dissolve the

military commission convened to try him." In re al-Nashiri, 835 F.3d 110, 113 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
The D.C. Circuit held that whether the charged crime occurred outside the context of hostilities is
not "clear and indisputable," and therefore that al-Nashiri was not entitled to the writ. Id. at 136-

37.
111.

See USS Cole Bombing Fast Facts, supra note 106.

112. See Withdrawal of Charges in the Case of United States v. Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri,
ACLU (Feb. 5, 2009), https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/withdrawal-charges-case-united-

states-v-abd-al-rahim-al-nashiri; In re al-Nashiri, 921 F.3d 224, 227 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
113. See Tim Ryan, Feds Get Tough Audience at DC Circuit in Cole Bombing Case,
COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.courthousenews.com/feds-get-toughaudience-at-dc-circuit-in-cole-bombing-case; In re al-Nashiri, 921 F.3d at 227.

114.

Judge Spath's replacement, Judge Shelly Schools, took the reins on August 6, 2018. In

re al-Nashiri, 921 F.3d at 231.
115.

SeeInreal-Nashiri,921F.3dat227.
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secretly hired by the DOJ, 11 6 even as the DOJ continued to play a significant
role in prosecuting al-Nashiri.1 1 7
In fact, Judge Spath attempted to bolster his candidacy for an immigration
judgeship by highlighting his position presiding over the al-Nashiri case, and
even utilized one of his written rulings from the case as a writing sample."
Further, during the time in which his application was pending with DOJ, Judge
Spath made a number of significant rulings in favor of the prosecution-rulings
that, whatever their merits, look questionable at minimum in light of his position
as a job applicant before the prevailing party. Moreover, in the months leading
up to his departure, Judge Spath repeatedly and pointedly criticized the defense
9
team for its responses to those rulings.1 1
The story of those months is remarkable on its own, but it is truly
extraordinary when viewed in light of the fact that Judge Spath was
simultaneously seeking employment in the DOJ. In August of 2017, counsel
for al-Nashiri discovered a hidden microphone in the location they had been
using to meet with their client. 12 0 The government responded by noting that the
existence of such microphones was classified-meaning, among other things,
that it could not be disclosed to al-Nashiri-and that there were some "legacy
microphones" in meeting areas that were no longer inuse. 12 1 Judge Spath
denied the defense team discovery over the microphones, denied them a hearing
on the issue (because the prosecution team assured him that none of them had
personally listened in on meetings between al-Nashiri and his counsel), and

116. For more detail on the timeline of Judge Spath's negotiations, see Carol Rosenberg,
War Court Judge Pursued Immigration Job for Years While Presiding Over USS Cole Case,
MCCLATCHY

D.C.

(Nov.

20,

2018,

5:00

AM),

https://www.mcclatchydc.com/latest-

news/article221557485.html.
117. The size and complexity of the DOJ was not enough to save Judge Spath from a conflict
because "the Attorney General himself is directly involved in selecting and supervising immigration
judges." In re al-Nashiri, 921 F.3d at 235. Moreover, although the D.C. Circuit concluded that the

DOJ's role in prosecuting al-Nashiri was smaller than the DOD's, DOJ involvement nevertheless
remained significant:
First, the Justice Department, presumably with the approval of the Attorney General,
detailed one of its lawyers to prosecute Al-Nashiri.... And Commission transcripts

reveal that this Justice Department lawyer's participation was far from perfunctory;
indeed, he appears to have been the prosecution team's second-in-command for at least
part of the time.
Id. at 236 (citation omitted). "Second, aside from the particulars of Al-Nashiri's case, the Attorney
General plays an important institutional role in military commissions more generally," including
appearing "by name twice in the Military Commissions Act." Id. Thus, "the Attorney General was
a participant in Al-Nashiri's case from start to finish: he has consulted on commission trial
procedures, he has loaned out one of his lawyers, and he will play a role in defending any conviction
on appeal." Id.
118. See id. at227; Ryan, supra note 113.
119. See infra notes 276-278 and accompanying text.
120. See Baker, supra note 8, at 39.
121. See id. at 39-40.
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denied them specific permission to disclose to their client that their meetings
might have been compromised. 122
Unable to describe the situation to al-Nashiri or to investigate further, one
of al-Nashiri's attorneys then brought the situation to an expert on legal ethics,
who advised the attorney that that it was not possible to continue representing
al-Nashiri in a manner consistent with his ethical obligations "to act diligently
and competently, to maintain confidentiality, and [to] adhere to the duties of
loyalty and communication." 123 The expert, Professor Ellen Yaroshefsky,
advised al-Nashiri's counsel that withdrawal was required.1 2 4 The three civilian
members of al-Nashiri's four-attorney defense team-Rick Kammen (alNashiri's experienced capital defense attorney), Rosa Eliades, and Mary
Spears12 5-approached the Chief Defense Counsel (CDC), a Brigadier General
in the U.S. Marine Corps named John Baker, 126 to seek permission to withdraw
from the case. 12 7 Baker ultimately authorized their withdrawal, and the trio left
the team in October of 2017.128
The sole remaining attorney on al-Nashiri's team at the time, Lieutenant
Alaric Piette, "[did] not qualify as learned counsel in capital cases and [was] not
qualified to serve as the sole counsel in capital cases under the Military
Commissions Act of 2009.129 Judge Spath nevertheless repeatedly denied
Piette's motions to abate proceedings, finding that al-Nashiri was not entitled to
an experienced capital defense attorney "at every aspect of every
proceeding, . . . especially when it doesn't relate to capital matters." 130 Pretrial proceedings thus continued for several months with Piette operating as the
only defense attorney for al-Nashiri (against four members of the prosecution
team, including the chief prosecutor for the commissions, an attorney from the

122. See id.
123. In re al-Nashiri,921 F.3d at 229 (alteration in original) (quoting Ellen Yaroshefsky).
124. See id.
125. Carol Rosenberg, Now We Know Why Defense Attorneys Quit the USS Cole Case.They
Found a
Microphone.,
MCCLATCHY
D.C.
(Mar.
7,
2018,
1:05
PM),
https://www.mcclatchydc.com/article203916094.html (identifying the members of al-Nashiri's
defense team).
126. Baker, supra note 8, at 35, 40 (noting in a speech in2018 that, "[flor three years now,
[Brigadier General John G. Baker] ha[s] been privileged to head the Military Commissions Defense
Organization" and describing his role).
127. See id. at 40; see also Rosenberg, supra note 125 (describing the departure of alNashiri's civilian defense counsel); In re al-Nashiri, 921 F.3d at 228 (briefly describing the role of
each attorney). The CDC supervises the defense teams as head of the MCDO, but it does not actually
represent any of the defendants. See Baker, supra note 8, at 35.
128. In re al-Nashiri,921 at 229 ("Baker, citing 'all the information [he knew] about this
matter-both classified and unclassified,' found 'good cause' to terminate the representations on
October 11, 2017.") (alteration in original).
129. Baker v. Spath, No. 17-CV-02311-RCL, 2018 WL 3029140 at *1 (D. D.C. June 18,
2018).
130. In re al-Nashiri, 921 F.3d at 230 (quoting Commission Transcript 10084 (Nov. 3,
2017)).
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DOJ, and two judge advocates). 131 Judge Spath made a number of rulings on
pre-trial matters during that time while Piette abstained from substantive
participation in the proceedings on the grounds that al-Nashiri remained entitled
to learned counsel. 132
At the same time, Judge Spath refused to accept Baker's decision to
excuse the civilian contingent of al-Nashiri's defense team, ordering Baker to
rescind his consent to the attorneys' departure. 133 When Baker refused
(claiming that Judge Spath's order was unlawful), Judge Spath held Baker in
contempt, sentencing him to twenty-one-days confinement and fining him
$1,000.134 In June of 2018, Baker had his conviction vacated, prevailing on a
habeas petition filed in federal court on the grounds that military commission
judges like Judge Spath lack unilateral contempt power.135
Judge Spath also declared Baker's excusal "null and void," 136 insisting
137
that only he could excuse the attorneys and finding "no good cause" doso.
In mid-October of 2017, he thus ordered Kammen, Eliades, and Spears to
appear at the next scheduled hearing for the case. 138 They did not comply.139
Judge Spath again attempted to order Eliades and Spears to appear in December
of 2017.140 When the two refused and explained their rationale for doing so via
letter, Judge Spath twice directed the government to compel their appearance
with subpoenas. 14 1 Eliades and Spears moved to quash the subpoenas, and on
February 12, 2018, Judge Spath denied those motions from the bench. 14 2 When
Eliades and Spears still refused to appear the next day, Judge Spath "directed
the government to draft writs of attachment for their arrest so that . . he would
have 'options available .. . when we get here tomorrow.' 143 Judge Spath did
not conclusively address the issue over the next two days as he continued "trying
to figure out what to do";` but, on February 16, he "indefinitely" abated the

131. See id.
132. Id.
133. Baker, supra note 8, at 40.
134. Carol Rosenberg, Gitmo JudgeSends Marine General Lawyer to 21 Days Confinement
for
Disobeying
Orders,
MIAMI
HERALD
(Nov.
1,
2017,
9:50
AM),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/guantanamo/articlel82031196.html.
135. See Baker v. Spath, No. 17-CV-02311-RCL, 2018 WL 3029140 at *1 (D. D.C. June
18,2018).
136. Rosenberg, supra note 134 (quoting Judge Spath).
137. In re al-Nashiri,921 at 229 (quoting Judge Spath).
138. See id. at 230.
139. See id. Kammen brought his own suit over the government's efforts to compel his
appearance. See JP Schnapper-Casteras, On Guantanamo,SCHNAPPER-CASTERAS PLLC (Sept. 12,

2019), https://schnappercasteras.com/2019/09/12/on-guantanamo.
140. See In re al-Nashiri,921 F.3d at 230.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 231 (quoting Commission Transcript 11914-15 (Feb. 14, 2018)).
144. Id. (quoting Commission Transcript 11919 (Feb. 14, 2018)).
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proceedings in al-Nashiri's case.1 4 5 Speaking from the bench, Judge Spath
referenced his "frustration with the defense" over the previous five months,
noted the need for "action from somebody other than [him]" ("a superior
court"), and mused that "[i]t might be time for [him] to retire, frankly." 1 4 6 He
neglected to mention that, the night before, he had received an offer to start as
an immigration judge in July of 2018.147
B. The Recent Contributionsof the USCMCR
This dramatic standoff with the defense team took place throughout the
second half of Judge Spath's application and negotiation process for a position
within the DOJ. 1 4 8 Judge Spath put in his retirement paperwork with the
military during the abatement while the government was appealing to the
USCMCR to restart proceedings. 14 9 Thus, al-Nashiri learned that Judge Spath
was retiring during early 2018, though he remained unaware that Judge Spath
was moving on to work for the DOJ.1 o Finally, in the summer of 2018, alNashiri's defense team received "credible reports" that Judge Spath had pursued
employment as an immigration judge."'
The team sought discovery on the
subject, which the prosecution opposed on the grounds that the defense concerns
were mere "unsubstantiated assertions." 1 52 Within a week, the Associated Press
published a photograph of Judge Spath standing beside Attorney General Jeff
Sessions as the latter welcomed a new class of immigration judges.1 5 3
With the trial court in abatement, al-Nashiri looked to the USCMCR,
filing a motionto compel discovery on the issue of Judge Spath'sjob application
and seeking to vacate Judge Spath's rulings. 154 On September 28, the USCMCR
denied that motion; it found that al-Nashiri had not yet developed the factual
record around the issue at the trial level (though al-Nashiri's hands were tied in
that respect by Judge Spath's ongoing abatement), and also found that al-Nashiri
"had failed to 'show[] that a "reasonable and informed observer would question

145.
146.

Id. (quoting Commission Transcript 12376 (Feb. 16, 2018)).
Id. at 231 (quoting Commission Transcript 12364, 12374 (Feb. 16, 2018)); see also

Rosenberg, supra note 116 (describing these events).
147.

In re al-Nashiri, 921 F.3d at 231.

148.
149.
150.

See id.
Id.
Id.

151.

Id. (quoting Petition for a Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition 23, In re al-Nashiri, No.

18-1279 (Oct. 4, 2018)).
152. Id. at 231 (quoting Corrected Attachments to Petitioner's Petition for a Writ of
Mandamus and Prohibition at Attachment B, at 1, In re al-Nashiri, No. 18-1279 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 4,

2018)).
153.

Id.; see also Britain Eakin, Terror Rulings Vacated Over Risk of Bias from Military

Judge, COURTHOUSE NEWs SERV. (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.courthousenews.com/terrorrulings-vacated-over-risk-of-bias-from-military-judge (showing the photograph).

154.

In re al-Nashiri,921 F.3d at 232.
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[Spath's] impartiality.""" A month later, on October 11, the USCMCR ruled
on the government's appeal from Judge Spath's February abatement.1 5 6 The
panel sided with Judge Spath on the departure of al-Nashiri's civilian counsel,
ordering the pre-trial proceedings to resume and the civilian attorneys to return
to continue representing al-Nashiri. 1 5 7 The panel also agreed in substance with
Judge Spath on the limitations of al-Nashiri's right to learned counsel,
emphasizing that the right is not absolute and exists only "to the 'greatest extent
practicable."""
As he had already petitioned the D.C. Circuit for a writ of
mandamus, al-Nashiri then asked both the USCMCR and the D.C. Circuit for a
stay until that petition was resolved.1 5 9 The USCMCR denied the motion on
November 2, stating that al-Nashiri should make his motion to disqualify Judge
Spath to the new trial judge at the commissions. 16 0
The USCMCR's role in this incident extends beyond consistently denying
al-Nashiri's motions, however. 16 1 One of the USCMCR's judges who had also
served as an Air Force judge-Colonel Mark Allred-wrote a recommendation
for Judge Spath's application to the DOJ in November of 2015. 162 When asked
about the propriety of recommending Judge Spath under the circumstances,
Judge Allred defended his decision. 163 He noted it was common for military
judges to seek recommendation letters to become administrative law judges,
which was "kind of their dream job," and said he had written dozens of such
recommendations for lawyers and judges. 164 He was not aware of a policy
requiring Air Force judges to disclose such job applications, and, though he
conceded the possibility of conflicts, said such assessments should be made on
"a case-by-case basis." 165 (Additionally, Judge Spath received a reference from

155.
156.
157.
158.
2018)).
159.
160.

Id. (quoting Order 2, United States v. Al-Nashiri, No. 18-002 (CMCR Sept. 28, 2018)).
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. al-Nashiri, No. 18-002, slip op. at 21, 34 (CMCR Oct. 11,
Id.
Id.

161. Vladeck has heavily criticized the USCMCR on a number of different grounds. See,
e.g., Steve Vladeck, Why Aren't the Military Commissions Working? Look No Further Than alNashiri, LAWFARE (May 21, 2018, 10:18 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-arent-military-

comnissions-working-look-no-further-al-nashiri ("I've written before about the 'misbegotten'
CMCR-a court that has spent its entire history slowing down the military commissions and
embracing pro-government arguments that couldn't even get a single vote from the D.C. Circuit
under 'plain error' review.") [hereinafter Vladeck, Look No Further];see also Vladeck, supra note
5 (identifying both structural and substantive failings of the court).
162. Rosenberg, supra note 116. Judge Allred was appointed to the USCMCR in 2014 and
left in 2016. See Judge Allred's official resume at COLONEL MARK L. ALLRED,
https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/CMCRJudges/Judge%20Allred%2OBio.pdf.
163. Rosenberg, supra note 116.
164. Id. (quoting Judge Allred).
165. Id. The article also quotes Allred as saying, "I don't see it as a specious argument [to
assess conflicts on a case-by-case basis], nor am I particularly alarmed by it." Id.

2020] THE CYNICAL SUCCESSES OF GUANTANAMO BAY MILITARY COMMISSIONS

25

the staff director of the trial judiciary and Judge Spath'sfonnerattorney-advisor
on the al-Nashiri matter, retired Army Colonel Fred Taylor.)166
More generally, its handling of the Judge Spath conflict is not the only
occasion on which the USCMCR has fared poorly before the D.C. Circuit. 16 7 It
is not even the first time the circuit issued a writ of mandamus to the USCMCR
over the conduct of a commission judge. 16 8 In 2017, the D.C. Circuit recused
the Deputy Chief Judge of the USCMCR, Scott Silliman, from Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed's case. 16 9 Before becoming a judge, Judge Silliman made public
statements expressing the view that Mohammed was complicit in the 9/11
attacks-thus taking a position on his guilt and warranting a recusal under the
Rules of Practice for the USCMCR. 17 0 In issuing that writ, the D.C. Circuit also
vacated a USCMCR ruling in Mohammed's case made by a panel that included
Judge Silliman. 17 1 Additionally, even when the circuit has declined to issue a
writ, it has more than once suggested that the USCMCR got things wrong. 17 2
C. The D.C. Circuit's Vacatur ofJudge Spath's Rulings
Following this chain of adverse decisions before the USCMCR throughout
late 2018, al-Nashiri then secured the intervention of the D.C. Circuit, which
held an oral argument on al-Nashiri's motion for a writ of mandamus before
Judges Rogers, Tatel, and Griffith on January 22, 2019.173 During oral
166.

Id.

167.

For some more background on the performance of the USCMCR, see Vladeck, Look

No Further, supra note 161; Vladeck, supra note 5.
168.

See Vladeck, Look No Further, supra note 161.

169.

See In re Mohammad, 866 F.3d 473, 477 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

170.

Id. at 475-76.

171.

Id. at 477.

172.

See Vladeck, Look No Further, supra note 161 (explaining that "in two ...

cases, [the

D.C. Circuit] dropped strong hints that the CMCR got matters wrong even while holding that the

plaintiff couldn't meet the exceptionally high bar for mandamus relief"). As noted above, Vladeck
has also offered pointed criticism of the performance of the USCMCR. For example, though he
primarily blames Congress for the design of the court, Vladeck has argued the USCMCR has failed

the most salient goals it might have been designed to achieve and that "all [the USCMCR] has really
accomplished in these cases is to (1) slow them down; while (2) answering the questions presented

in ways that have had little bearing (other than proving deeply vulnerable) on subsequent appeal."
Vladeck, supra note 5; see also Robert Chesney, Undue Delay at the CMCR re the Viability of
Material Support and Conspiracy Charges and the Ability to Raise ConstitutionalArguments in
Commission
Proceedings,
LAWFARE
(Jan.
4,
2011,
11:16
AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/undue-delay-cmcr-re-viability-material-support-and-conspiracy-

charges-and-ability-raise (criticizing "undue delay" at the USCMCR in 2011). Indeed, as Vladeck
has pointed out, the complexity of creating a trial court from scratch is compounded by an order of
magnitude when the government simultaneously creates a corresponding appellate court from

scratch as well. See Vladeck, supra note 5 (observing that "Congress created a hithertounprecedented system in which a military commission conviction would first be appealed to a
brand-new Article I military appeals court, then to an Article III civilian Court of Appeals.").

173.

Oral Argument, In re al-Nashiri, 921 F.3d 224 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (No. 18-1279),

https://www.courtlistener.com/audio/61108/abd-al-rahim-hussein-al-nashir/.
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argument, al-Nashiri asked the court to vacate the pretrial proceedings in the
case. He argued that Judge Spath had violated four canons of judicial ethicsany one of which alone would justify granting his preferred form of relief, but
which collectively "shocked the conscience." First, al-Nashiri claimed that
Judge Spath had knowingly concealed facts calling his impartiality into
question.
Second, Judge Spath had sought to position himself for an
appointment from the Attorney General (AG) at the same time that the AG and
the DOJ had a substantial interest in the case before him. Third, Judge Spath
had traded on his status as a judge in this case-an important, capital case-for
his own personal gain. Fourth, and worst of all from al-Nashiri's perspective,
Judge Spath had allowed his personal financial interests to influence his
handling and scheduling of the case. 1 74 Notably, al-Nashiri pointed out that the
first two of these issues were before the USCMCR but the latter two were not. 175
Additionally, al-Nashiri argued that Judge Spath's conduct revealed notjust the
appearance of bias but actual bias. 176
The government's position was that the D.C. Circuit should send the
matter back to the new trial judge assigned to al-Nashiri's case. 177 Specifically,
the government wanted the trial judge to develop the record surrounding Judge
Spath's conduct while he was seeking an appointment as an immigrationjudge,
including securing Judge Spath's testimony.17 At the time of the argument, it
was unclear which judge would handle the matter if it were remanded below;
however, as Judge Tatel pointed out, there was a reasonable possibility that the
presiding judge would be Judge Shelly Schools-the judge initially designated
as Judge Spath's replacement, who had also successfully applied to become an
immigration judge. 179 Judge Tatel in particular was unimpressed with the
suggestion that the matter might end up before Judge Schools.18 0 Moreover, as
Judge Tatel noted, Judge Spath's state of mind at various points in the pursuit
of his new position would not have been relevant to the objective test that the
D.C. Circuit applies in evaluating the appearance of bias introduced by judicial
conduct.8
On April 16, 2019, the D.C. Circuit issued a unanimous and forceful ruling
that all orders issued by Judge Spath in the al-Nashiri matter, dating back to
November of 2015 (when he applied to become an immigration judge), must be

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 2:17.
Id. at 2:35.
See id. at 7:30.
See id. at 26:35.
See id. at 25:50.
See In re al-Nashiri,921 F.3d at 233.
See Oral Argument at 27:12, In re al-Nashiri, 921 F.3d 224 (No. 18-1279),

https://www.courtlistener.com/audio/61108/abd-al-rahim-hussein-al-nashir.

181.

Seeid.at59:40.
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vacated. 18 2 The court noted that the circumstances "easily satisfied" 1 8 3 the
exacting standard for issuing the "'drastic' remedy" of a writ of mandamus. 8 4
The panel stated that "it is beyond question thatjudges may not adjudicate cases
involving their prospective employers.""'
In the court's view, the job
application alone would have warranted Judge Spath's disqualification,1 8 6 but
Judge Spath further compromised the appearance of neutrality by trading on his
role in the al-Nashiri case explicitly ("making his performance as presiding
judge a key point in his argument for employment") and by failing to disclose
his application at any point to al-Nashiri. 18 7 (Notably, the D.C. Circuit's
decision was based in significant part on information about Judge Spath's
application to the DOJ obtained not from Judge Spath himself, but rather by
New York Times reporter Carol Rosenberg via a request under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA).) 88
D. The Underlying CulturalProblems at the Commissions
Crucially, the D.C. Circuit also noticed that the situation before it had not
arisen from a discrete, erroneous judgment by Judge Spath; the facts of the case
revealed that something deeper had gone awry with the commissions. The panel
therefore issued a stinging, broader critique:
Although a principle so basic to our system of laws should go
without saying, we nonetheless feel compelled to restate it plainly
here: criminaljustice is a shared responsibility. Yet in this case, save
for Al-Nashiri's defense counsel, all elements of the military

182.

See In re al-Nashiri, 921 F.3d at 240; see also supra note 12 (noting that the D.C.

Circuit ruling implicated 460 of Judge Spath's written rulings, an unspecified number of oral
rulings, and at least four published USCMCR rulings); In re al-Nashiri, 921 F.3d at 238 (noting that
the government represented to the court that Spath had made "many oral rulings from the bench"
and "issued approximately 460 written orders" during the time in question) (quoting Brief of the
United States in Opposition 8, In re al-Nashiri, No. 18-1279 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 16, 2018)).
183. In re al-Nashiri, 921 F.3d at 238.
184. Id. at 237 (quoting Fornaro v. James, 416 F.3d 63, 69 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
185. Id. at 235. See also id. at 235-36. The government had contested the significance of
the DOJ's involvement in the commissions, given the primary role reserved for the DOD. The court
was not persuaded by that argument, noting that, despite the size and complexity of DOJ, "it is
enough to decide this case to know that the Attorney General himself is directly involved in selecting
and supervising immigration judges." Id. at 235. That is because, according to the court, "the
Attorney General was a participant in Al-Nashiri's case from start to finish: he has consulted on
commission trial procedures, he has loaned out one of his lawyers [to the prosecution team], and he
will play a role in defending any conviction on appeal." Id. at 236.
186. See id. at 237.
187. Id.
188. See id. at 227; see also Lauren Harper, Reporter CarolRosenberg's FOIA Request
Changes

Course

of

al-Nashiri

Trial,

UNREDACTED

(Apr.

19,

2019),

https://unredacted.com/2019/04/19/reporter-carol-rosenbergs-foia-request-changes-course-of-alnashiri-trial-frinformsum-4-19-2019/ (identifying Carol Rosenberg as the one who filed the FOIA
request that turned up Judge Spath's application to become an immigration judge).
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commission system-from the prosecution team to the Justice
Department to the [US]CMCR to the judge himself-failed to live
up to that responsibility.1 8 9
By questioning the decision-making of Judge Spath, the USCMCR, the
prosecution team, and the DOJ more broadly, the panel in essence condemned
the culture of the commissions.1 9 0 The situation before the court arose over
many months and as a result of countless, distinct choices by important officials.
Yet decisions of the sort that invited the D.C. Circuit's criticism-alarming
decisions reflecting the norms that officials at the commissions have adoptedare not uncommon at the commissions. While the structural features of the
commissions have undergone changes since 2001, key officials with power over
the commissions have consistently prioritized factors other than the transparent,
speedy, and fair trial of commission defendants.
Considerjust a sample, all drawn from the third phase of the commissions.
In 2011, Joint Task Force Guantinamo, which maintains custody of
Guantnamo detainees, "seized, copied, and translated all written material in all
detainees' possession," including "documents very clearly marked as attorneyclient privileged." 1 9 1 These seizures occurred following consultation with the
Joint Task Force's attorneys. 19 2 In early 2013, lawyers for the 9/11 defendants
discovered that some unidentified intelligence agency had the power to "shut
down live courtroom proceedings without the knowledge or assent of the
judge and that the same agency had the ability to listen to courtroom
conversations, including between defense counsel and their clients, through the
microphones placed on defense tables." 19 3 Around the same time, a defense
attorney found that the smoke detectors affixed to the ceilings of all of the
attorney-client meeting rooms designated for use by commission defendants
were in fact disguised recording devices. 194 And, in 2014, the FBI successfully
infiltrated the defense team of a commission defendant, persuading a defense

189. In re al-Nashiri,921 F.3d at 239-40.
190. Marc Falkoff has suggested to me that the ethos of the commissions might reflect a
complex amalgam of multiple constituent cultures, including at minimum a military culture and a
legal (or lawyers') culture. This is a plausible suggestion, though of course courts martial are likely
to feature a fusion of both military and legal cultures as well. In what follows, I argue that the source
of the ethos of the commissions can be traced at least in part to the political environment in which
they were created-namely, the very first days of the War on Terror-and the contemporaneous
attitudes of the key political actors behind their creation. Additional qualitative research may well
reveal more detail.
191. Baker, supra note 8, at 38.
192. See id.
193. Id. at 38-39 (footnote omitted); see also Amy Davidson Sorkin, A Red Light at
Guantdnamo,NEW YORKER (Jan. 29, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/ared-light-at-guantnamo (describing the judge himself as "confused and angry" when, for the first
time, some unseen person from a remote location triggered a flashing light in the courtroom and the
accompanying "censor" function that prevents secret information disclosed in the courtroom from
reaching those who are publicly observing the proceedings).
194. Baker, supra note 8, at 39.
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security official on the team (who had unfettered access to the defendant's legal
files) to sign an agreement to become a confidential FBI informant against the
MCDO.1 95
In yet another incident, during a hearing in 2015, a defendant in the 9/11
case claimed to recognize "the court interpreter sitting at his defense table from
one of the 'black sites' where he was interrogated and tortured."1 96 Years later,
reporting confirmed that the defendant was telling the truth: the interpreter had
served as a CIA linguist, and had lied about his role when interviewed by
defense attorneys upon being assigned to the 9/11 commission case.1 97 Defense
attorneys have sought to secure the testimony of the linguist, in part because he
is an eyewitness to the circumstances of the defendant's detention at the hands
of the CIA.1 9 8 According to the New York Times:
The prosecutors have been so determined to stop the
testimony-or at least restrict it to a secret session-that they put the
judge on notice last month: If he opted for open-court testimony,
even if delivered in a way that masked the interpreter's identity and
distorted his voice, the government would invoke a national security
privilege and refuse to let him testify at all. 99
Questions about transparency, speed, and fairness at the commissions
continue to arise even in the months and years immediately preceding
publication of this Article. In 2017, Chief Prosecutor Mark Martins imposed a
"media blackout" by stopping a long-standing practice of holding news
conferences. 200 In 2019, Lieutenant Alaric Piette-the last attorney standing on
al-Nashiri's defense team after the standoff with Judge Spath detailed abovewas passed over for promotion in a move that appears retaliatory for his fierce
advocacy of an unpopular client. 20 1 Around the same time, another commission
judge who successfully applied to become an immigration judge testified before
the commissions that the D.C. Circuit ruling in the Spath matter surprised him

195. See Spencer Ackerman, Guantdnamo Hearings Halted Amid Accusations of FBI
Spying
on
Legal
Team,
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
14,
2014,
2:07
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/14/guantanamo-bay-hearing-halted-fbi-spying;
Baker, supra note 8, at 39.

196.

Baker, supra note 8, at 39.

197.

See Carol Rosenberg, The Strange Case of the C.I.A. Interpreter and the 9/11 Trial,

N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/14/us/gitmo-trial-ciainterpreter.html?sniid=nytcore-ios-share.
198. See id.
199. Id.
200. Carol Rosenberg, Pentagon's War Crimes Prosecutor Begins a Media Blackout at
Guantdnamo,

MIAMI

HERALD

(Nov.

1,

2017,

8;17

AM),

https://amp.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/guantanamo/article182020876.htmltwitterimpression=true.
201.

See Carol Rosenberg, Military Lawyer Denied Promotion While Defending Qaeda

Suspect, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/22/us/politics/navylawyer-promotion-guantanamo.html#click=https://t.co/CbVqeV7q6o.
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and a number of other judges, 2 0 2 and that it "'did not occur to' him" that
applying to a job at DOJ while presiding over a prosecution undertaken in
significant part by the DOJ created "even the appearance of a conflict of
interest."203

Perhaps even more striking, interrogators extracted inadmissible
confessions from some 9/11 defendants by torturing them while they were held
in CIA custody between 2002 and 2006.20 Once the defendants arrived at
Guantinamo, the Bush administration assembled "clean teams" of FBI agents
to question them in an effort to obtain new, admissible confessions. 205
According to prosecutors, the FBI teams operated "independently of what
happened during the period when the defendants were tortured." 20 6 But in the
summer of 2019, defendants argued that they have obtained evidence that the
CIA and FBI coordinated during both phases of the defendants' questioningand thus that " [t]he clean teams were a fiction from the very beginning" because
the two agencies have been operating jointly as "one big team" throughout. 207
Against that background, the Spath incident reveals a continuity of culture.
Of all of the parties involved, Judge Spath's decisions are perhaps the most
striking. As the trial judge in one of the commissions' major prosecutions, he
refused to disclose the existence of a pending job application with the DOJ.
With his application under consideration for months at one of the prosecuting
departments, Judge Spath shrugged off defense concerns about the presence of
hidden microphones in client meeting spaces, repeatedly blocking efforts by
defense attorneys to explore the matter or even disclose it to their client. In
doing so, Judge Spath forced the attorneys into a manifest ethical conflict. Yet
when defense counsel consequently sought to withdraw, Judge Spath
aggressively pursued sanctions both against them and against their supervisor.
It is noteworthy that frustration with the defense team specifically characterized
Judge Spath's final months with the commissions even as the D.C. Circuit
singled out the defense team as the only relevant commission entity to handle
its responsibilities properly in this entire episode.
But let us not forget the USCMCR, which, already standing on a poor
record before the D.C. Circuit and featuring an alumnus judge who wrote a
recommendation for the trial judge's secretjob application, blocked al-Nashiri's
request for discovery concerning a clear violation of the rules of judicial
conduct.
The USCMCR also denied that Judge Spath's comportment

202. See Carol Rosenberg (@carolrosenberg), TWITTER (Aug. 24, 2019, 11:24 AM),
https://twitter.com/carolrosenberg/status/1165283845970833409.
203. Carol Rosenberg (@carolrosenberg), TWITTER (Aug. 24, 2019, 11:20 AM) (quoting
Judge Waits), https://twitter.com/carolrosenberg/status/1165282691476054016.
204. See Carol Rosenberg, Lawyers Press Case That 9/11 Confessions Given to F.B.I. Are
Tainted, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/29/us/politics/september11-confessions-guantanamo.html#click=https://t.co/GnRlbczFd.

205.
206.

Id.
Id.

207.

Id. (quoting Cheryl Bormann).
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introduced the appearance of bias, only to be slapped down by yet another writ
of mandamus issued unanimously by a three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit.
The prosecutors, meanwhile, persistently opposed discovery both on the
hidden microphones and on Judge Spath's job application. When the matter of
Judge Spath's conduct came before the D.C. Circuit, the prosecutors asked an
incredulous panel to send the matter back down to Judge Spath's replacement
to develop the record on Judge Spath's actual motivation. Prosecutors made
that request knowing that the information they sought to develop was irrelevant
to the objective legal test the circuit was bound to apply, that Judge Spath's
replacement had also applied successfully to become an immigration judge, and
that the matter would almost certainly end up before the D.C. Circuit once again
in a matter of months anyway. And notwithstanding the forcefulness with
which the D.C. Circuit vacated most of Judge Spath's rulings, prosecutors
20 8
promptly asked Judge Spath's replacement to reinstate those very rulings.
Then there is the DOJ, which-operating across two administrations and
two Attorneys General of different political parties-entertained and ultimately
approved the application of Judge Spath. Never mind that Judge Spath was
presiding over a case that required careful handling as one of the most important
capital cases in the country. The DOJ hired Judge Spath as an immigration
judge when his applicationfor the position was a glaring violation of the
governing rules ofjudicial conduct.
None of these incidents make any sense if we presume that the officials
who caused them were motivated by the same goals as most observers. Each of
the underlying decisions, especially when understood within its broader
historical context, would tend to slow the proceedings, generate results plainly
vulnerable to appellate or collateral attack, suggest that the government was
attempting to hide illicit tampering with the defense teams, or otherwise
diminish the public's confidence in the proceedings.
Given how many
agencies' interests are affected by the commissions, perhaps one or two
anomalous incidents could be excused as reflecting bad judgment, crossed
wires, or even the misplaced priorities of isolated officials. But the pattern at
the commissions is unmistakable, for all of these decisions cut in the same
direction: against the defendants.
Time and again, officials with power over the commissions have acted in
a manner that plainly undermines the fairness-or, at the very least, the
appearance of fairness-of the proceedings as concerns the putative rights of
the defendants. And that pattern holds true even after the implementation of
structural reforms in 2009 that, on paper, make the commissions somewhat
fairer to defendants than initially was the case. Moreover, in none of the
instances detailed above were the questionable decisions compelled by
structural features like the practical difficulties of litigating in a remote location
or specific rules that strictly prohibited alternative outcomes. Features of that

208. Carol Rosenberg, Judge Rules Prosecutors Misrepresented Evidence from C.I.A. Sites,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/08/us/politics/gitmo-uss-coletrial.html#click=https://t.co/vqmX6i4E4T.
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sort have likely facilitated the choices of officials to relegate traditional norms
to the background of the military commissions; but if officials had prioritized
conventional prosecutorial norms of seeking justice, each of these incidents
could have been avoided.
So, how could all of this happen? How could so many high-placed
officials, in diverse roles, consistently undermine the purported objectives of
the commission proceedings-even as the commissions were operating under
their "best" (though still flawed) structural configuration?
Two salient
possibilities present themselves. One is that the commissions are riddled with
incompetence, overrun by officials who, try as they might, simply cannot stop
themselves or their subordinates from making bad decisions. A second is that
a substantial number of relevant officials simply do not agree that the objectives
of the commissions are to be fair to the defendants, efficient, and accepted as
legitimate by the public. At minimum, a critical mass of agents with power over
the commissions are willing to subordinate those prototypical objectives to
"nontraditional" ones when the two conflict.
Of these two possibilities, the latter is far more plausible. Generalized
incompetence should cut both ways, but the valence of all these decisions points
in favor of the prosecution. Moreover, by most accounts, the commission
judges and prosecutors are experienced, intelligent, and capable people. The
most generous interpretation of their conduct-the one most consistent with a
presumption of competence-is that they have accepted (whether knowingly or
not) a different set of governing norms for the enterprise before them. Put
another way, the commissions suffer from a problem of culture.
Consider once more Judge Spath, who is in fact an experienced litigator
and judge. There is no reason to think he was unfamiliar with the norms that
govern typical prosecution proceedings-and even with respect to the
commissions, he had previously purported to accept some of the typical
objectives, like ensuring public confidence in the trials. In fact, Judge Spath
objected forcefully when, in February of 2015, the convening authority
expressed disappointment at the pace of commission proceedings and attempted
to implement a rule change that would have required the commissions judges to
live at Guantinamo Bay-generally considered an undesirable location, and
certainly one that would separate the judges from their families-until the trials
concluded. At the time, Judge Spath stated that, although he would not allow
such a rule to affect his decisions in the case, he could understand how a
reasonable observer might wonder whether pressure to wrap up the trials and
leave the base would factor into his rulings. 2 0 9 Judge Spath went so far as to
call the convening authority to testify over the rule change and ultimately barred
him from managing the case, thus forcing the appointment of a new convening
authority. 210
Whatever his motives at the time, Judge Spath clearly

209.

See Carol Rosenberg

(@carolrosenberg),

TWITTER (Mar. 2, 2015, 11:00 AM),

https://twitter.com/carolrosenberg/status/572426270589382656.
210. Sinha, supra note 96; see also Rosenberg, supra note 209 (noting Judge Spath's
concern that, under the new rule, the "public would easily wonder if decisions were made in the
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demonstrated the ability to discern how the proposed change might affect the
public's perceptions of the fairness of the military commissions. Yet, nearly a
year later, he submitted his application to the DOJ, predictably creating a much
larger cloud of partiality over his rulings than the proposed rule change he had
previously opposed.
It may not be possible to identify with certainty the specific norms that
shifted Judge Spath's views about the appearance of partiality. But it is not
difficult to posit plausible norms that various government officials might have
adopted that explain the choices documented above.
For certain law
enforcement or intelligence agencies, for example, the commissions appear to
serve as an auxiliary source of intelligence. For some judges or prosecutors,
ultimately securing a conviction may constitute the specific priority. 211 inany
case the next Section will explore why alternative norms like these might have
taken hold of actors at the commissions.
To be clear, none of this is meant to impugn the motives of every single
official with power over the commissions. There are striking examples of
officials with central roles in the administration of the commissions who
resisted the dominant ethos sketched out above (and described in more detail in
the following Section). Unfortunately, what makes these examples strikingfor example, the decision by Susan Crawford, who served as convening
authority of the commissions from 2007 to 2010, to decline to prosecute 9/1I's
so-called "20th hijacker" Mohammed al-Qahtani 212 on the grounds (as she later
explained) that he had been tortured in United States'custody 2 13 -is precisely
that they stand out against the bleak record of the commissions.

interests of speed rather than a just, fair outcome."). I attended this set of hearings at Guantnamo
Bay and was in fact struck quite favorably by Judge Spath's measured demeanor and apparent
interest in preventing a loss of public confidence in the commissions.
211. Prosecutors in civilian courts have certainly been accused of prioritizing convictions
overjustice as well. See Malia N. Brink, A Pendulum Swung Too Far: Why the Supreme CourtMust
Place Limits on ProsecutorialImmunity, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 1, 16 (2009) ("The pressure to

bring and win cases has infiltrated the very culture ofthe prosecutor's office. Prosecutors may have
once believed their role to be like that of a judge-to evaluate and determine when it is fair to bring
criminal charges or pursue a conviction. Now the primary purpose of the prosecutor is to seek as
many convictions as possible."); see generally, e.g., Alanah Odoms Hebert, ProsecutorsMust Be

Held Accountable for Misconduct, NOLA.coM
(Aug. 3, 2018,
12:57
https://www.nola.com/opinions/articlebd8404d8-a247-566c-9fef-cl44f03c5e7b.html;

PM),
John

Terzano, ProsecutorsMust Seek Justice, Not Merely Convictions, HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG

(Apr. 18, 2010), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/prosecutors-must-seek-jus b_464291. But the
pressure in the commission cases is especially significant because the charged crimes have dozens
if not thousands of victims, the crimes hold an especially significant place in the public
consciousness, and family members of the victims have flown down to watch the hearings for years
as the commissions have dragged on. See infra note 249 (describing one attorney's view that the
military commissions were designed to generate convictions).
212.

William Glaberson, Case Against 9/11 Detainee Is Dismissed, N.Y. TIMES (May 14,

2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/14/washington/14gitmo.html.
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Military

See Bob Woodward, Guantanamo Detainee Was Tortured, SaysOfficial Overseeing

Trials,

WASH.

POST

(Jan.

14,

2009),

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

34

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 34

In fact, some of the most notable instances of officials resisting the
prevailing ethos required self-sacrifice or triggered adverse consequences. In
2007, Colonel Morris Davis famously resigned from his position at the Chief
Prosecutor of the commissions after officials with a history of either licensing
the use of torture or the use of evidence obtained through torture were placed
above him in the chain of command. 2 14 As Davis put it, "When I learned that
two men who sanctioned torture were above me in the chain of command, I
concluded that I could not ensure fair trials for the detainees at Guantanamo." 215
In another incident, in 2018, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis fired
Convening Authority Harvey Rishikof-without notice and without
explanation, but seemingly because he was exploring the possibility of
accepting guilty pleas from the 9/11 defendants. 216 Rishikof's legal advisor was
removed at the same time. 217 Pleas carried the potential to resolve the case at
long last, but would have required prosecutors to accept a penalty for the
defendants less severe than death. 218
The Administration's subsequent
justification for the removals cited the pair's temperamental deficiencies,
though many (including Rishikof and his advisor) remained suspicious that this
was a pretext. 2 19 Notably, removing Rishikof in an attempt to influence the case
22 0
would have constituted unlawful command influence.
It is therefore undeniable that officials have passed through the
commissions without being compromised by the problematic norms that others
have apparently endorsed, and surely some remain there today. But that is
consistent with the idea that a pervasive cultural problem at the commissionsmore so than their structural features-explains their current state. 22 1 If
dyn/content/article/2009/01/13/AR2009011303372.html?hpid=topnews

(reporting part of an

interview with Susan Crawford that took place several months after she made the decision not to
prosecute al-Qahtani).
214.

See Morris Davis, Opinion, Here's Why I Resigned as the Chief Prosecutor at

Guantanamo, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oedavis-why-i-resigned-as-chief-prosecutor-for-military-commissions-guantanamo-20171004story.html.
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2018),

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/10/us/politics/guantanamo-sept-11-rishikof.html.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219.

Charlie Savage, Mattis Says Guantdnamo Lawyers Were Fired Over Temperament, Not

Legal
Work,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
22,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/22/us/politics/guantanamo-officials-fired-mattis.html.
220. Id.
221. There is almost certainly some relationship between the structural features of the
commissions and the governing norms. For more on this possibility, see infra Section IV. But there
are at least cognizable, neutral principles that may justify peculiar structural features of the
commissions. For example, Chief Prosecutor of the commissions, Mark Martins, stated in
conversation with my group of observers from a February 2015 visit to the commissions that special
rules on the admission of evidence are necessary to prosecute defendants for crimes committed in
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anything, the instant analysis highlights the power of governing norms because
it reveals their influence even in a system where their acceptance is not
universal. 2 22
As the next two Sections explore, although some elements of the
commissions' culture are comprehensible, they are not acceptable in any trial
system, and especially not in this one. Moreover, there is good reason to think
that the die was cast for the culture of the commissions by the context in which
they were born and the specific manner in which they were created. The
unfortunate truth is that the commissions were designed around some of the
fundamental norms of the broader War on Terror, and the commissions have
succeeded in internalizing those norms.
III. HAVE THE COMMISSIONS FALED?
One could accept that the prevailing norms of the commissions are the
fundamental drivers of their performance, as argued in the previous Section, and
still regard the commissions as a failure. 223 And accepting that we should focus
on the ethos of the commissions more than their structural features in no way
implies that the commissions have been more effective on the traditional metrics
of trial systems than observers have typically concluded. However, whether the
commissions have failed ultimately depends on what they were actually
designed to do. It is thus worth reconsidering the nature of our standards for
assessing the commissions. From where have we collectively derived the idea
that the commissions are supposed to provide fair trials?
One source, of course, is the government itself. For example, in the initial
executive order that authorized the commissions, President Bush described
them as offering "full and fair trial[s]."224 At various points tied to the structural
revisions implemented in 2006 and 2009, Presidents Bush and Obama both

war zones abroad, where it is much more difficult to obtain evidence and to maintain a proper chain
of custody over it. He has made similar remarks in public. See Wittes, supra note 104 (noting that,
in the third phase of the commissions, "[t]he exception to the hearsay rule requiring consideration
of operational and intelligence factors ... preserves confrontation rights but properly balances the
realities of armed conflict and our national security") (quoting Brigadier General Mark Martins). It
remains at least theoretically possible to accept such reasoning and the rules it implies without
accepting the propriety of a culture that deemphasizes traditional objectives. Moreover, though it
remains important to recognize structural problems in any justice system, it is difficult to evaluate
those features in the abstract, and it is not necessarily fruitful to attempt to do so given that the
implications of such features are tied in part to the norms that dictate how the officials in the system
approach their duties.
222. See infra Section IV.
223. In other words, one might accept the first proposition laid out in the introduction of this
Article and reject the second.
224. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism,
66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,835 (Nov. 16, 2001).
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described the commissions as fair or legitimate trial venues as well. 22 5 But that
is to be expected. Even if only as lip service, it would be essential for the
government to describe the commissions as a system of fair trials to generate
any support (domestic or international) for the project at all. Otherwise the
executive branch could just as well detain these suspects indefinitely without
charges, which is something it has done with other captives in the War on
Terror. 2 2 6 For the same reason, it is natural simply to presume without assurance
that, controlling for the special circumstances (such as the distant locations of
some of the crimes and the lack of control the United States maintains over the
crime scenes), the trials are intended in substance to mimic traditional courts to
the extent possible.
One might genuinely wonder what purpose the
commissions would serve otherwise, given the costs and logistical challenges
of creating and maintaining them.
But it is too credulous to accept those thin representations without a closer
look, especially when nearly two decades of history demonstrate a pervasive
cultural problem within the commissions. Revisiting the origins of the
commissions and various statements of previous Presidents in fact reveals a
different story. First, it is widely known (if not widely remembered) that the
executive order signed by President Bush on November 13, 2001 to create the
commissions was prepared almost exclusively by hardliners in the War on
Terror: Vice President Dick Cheney, his Legal Counsel, and a like-minded
lawyer at the DOJ. 22 7 Its contents triggered the strenuous opposition of Attorney

225.

See Press Release, supra note 53 ("We put forward a bill that ensures these

commissions are established in a way that protects our national security, and ensures a full and fair

trial for those accused."); Press Release, supra note 56
("These military commissions will provide a fairtrial, inwhichthe accused are presumed innocent,
have access to an attorney, and can hear all the evidence against them. These military commissions
are lawful, they are fair, and they are necessary."); Press Release, supranote 66 (proposing revisions

to the commissions that would thereafter become law and noting that "[t]hese reforms will begin to
restore the Commissions as a legitimate forum for prosecution, while bringing them in line with the

rule of law").
226.
Detention

See Charlie Savage & Carol Rosenberg, Justice Breyer Raises Specter of Perpetual
Without

Trial

at

Guantdnamo,

N.Y.

TIMES

(June

10,

2019),

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/10/us/politics/justice-breyer-

guantanamo.html?searchResultPosition=1 (reporting that the "Supreme Court on Monday refused
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American legal system is on autopilot toward permitting life imprisonment without trial.").
227. See BARTON GELLMAN, ANGLER: THE CHENEY VICE PRESIDENCY 162-68 (2008). The
key figures behind the order were David Addington, who was Legal Counsel to Vice President
Cheney at the time, and John Yoo, who then served as Deputy Assistant Attorney General at the
Office ofLegal Counsel at the DOJ. Id. Cheney is known for his aggressive posture on policy related
to the War on Terror. See, e.g., id. at 130 (reporting that, on the day of the 9/11 attacks, Cheney

asked Addington, "What extraordinary powers would the president need in the coming war?").
Addington has a similar reputation. See Jane Mayer, The Hidden Power, NEW YORKER (June 26,
2006), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/07/03/the-hidden-power
(describing David

Addington as having played "a central role in shaping the Administration's legal strategy for the
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General John Ashcroft. 228 In presenting it for Bush's signature, Cheney
deliberately and anomalously excluded the key officials from signing off,
including Secretary of State Colin Powell, National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice, the White House Counsel's Office, the White House
communications team, and President Bush's own Chief of Staff. 22 9 Thus there
was very limited opportunity for the order to reflect any views that conflicted
with Cheney's.
The day after President Bush signed the order, Vice President Cheney
gave a speech to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 230 At the end of the speech,
he fielded several questions, the last of which concerned the military
commissions described in the new executive order.
Asked how the
commissions would differ from an international tribunal, Cheney gave a
revealing answer. After explaining the precedent for the use of military
commissions generally, he articulated the basis for these commissions
specifically:
The basic proposition here is that somebody who comes into
the United States of America illegally, who conducts a terrorist
operation killing thousands of innocent Americans, men, women,
and children, is not a lawful combatant. They don't deserve to be
treated as a prisoner of war. They don't deserve the same guarantees
and safeguards that would be used for an American citizen going
through the normaljudicialprocess.. . . [T]hey will have a fair trial,
but it'll be under the procedures of a military tribunal and rules and
regulations to be established in connection with that. We think it's
the appropriate way to go. We think it[] guarantees that we'llhave

war on terror," which controversially asserted "that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, has the
authority to disregard virtually all previously known legal boundaries, if national security demands
it" and has been applied to set aside legal restrictions on "torture, secret detention, and warrantless
surveillance"). Yoo is often referred to as one of the authors of the "torture memos" relied uponby
the Bush Administration to deploy its "enhanced interrogation techniques" against detainees in the
war on terror. See, e.g., Rebecca Morin,
Administration
Post,
POLITICO

'Torture Memo' Author Nominated for Trump
(June
5,
2017,
10:05
PM),

https://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/05/trump-nominee-torture-bradbury-239167
(identifying
Yoo as one of "three principal authors" behind the memos); see also Jon Schwarz, John Yoo Thinks
PresidentsCan Legally Torture Children. Even He Has "Grave Concerns"About Donald Trump,

(Feb. 6, 2017, 1:47 PM), https://theintercept.com/2017/02/06/john-yoo-thinkspresidents-can-legally-torture-children-even-he-has-grave-concerns-about-donald-trump
(recounting a debate in which, when asked if there is any law that would prevent the President from
torturing a person, including by "crushing the testicles of the person's child," John Yoo replied, "I
think it depends on why the President thinks he needs to do that").
INTERCEPT

228.

GELLMAN, supra note 227, at 164-66.

229. Id. at 162-68.
230. See Press Release, Vice President Dick Cheney, Vice President Addresses U.S.
Chamber
of
Commerce
(Nov.
14,
2001),
https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011114-6.html.
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the kind of treatment of these individuals that we believe they
deserve.231
Cheney's response appears to describe the 9/11 defendants, but his view-the
view that gave birth to the military commissions-was that any defendant tried
before the commissions should fundamentally be treated worse throughout the
trial process than other defendants precisely in virtue of the charges they faced.
As noted above, those charges would ultimately vary substantially in gravity,
though they would all reflect the U.S. government's view (at times
controversial) of what constituted a violation of the laws of war.
The notion of determining the trial rights of a defendant based only on a
function of the accusations against him and his citizenship lends itself to a
number of substantive criticisms, not least because of its cart-before-horse logic
or its tension (explored more below) with the possibility of holding what
Cheney simultaneously described as a "fair trial." But more relevant for present
purposes is that the idea here-that commission defendants are intrinsically
deserving of worse treatment than defendants in other courts-constituted a
major part of the government's message concerning the commissions from the
moment they were authorized, even if it was not presented as an official
statement of their purpose. Indeed, President Bush did not make public remarks
upon signing the order, so Cheney's statements took on even greater
significance. 232
Later messaging from the highest levels of the government continued to
downplay the importance or reliability of the commissions at best, and even
endorse Cheney's comments at worst. As noted above, when the Supreme
Court issued its ruling in Hamdan, President Bush sought to address the Court's
concerns by seeking congressional authority for the commissions via the MCA
of 2006. Upon signing the initial MCA into law, Bush gave public remarks.
But those remarks did not focus on the military commissions; in fact, the name
of the bill notwithstanding, Bush did not even mention the military commissions
until the second half of his statement. 233 He focused instead on the bill's
implications for the CIA's "Enhanced Interrogation Program," preservation of
which was apparently the primary motivator behind the bill. According to Bush,
"When I proposed this legislation, I explained that I would have one test for the
bill Congress produced: Will it allow the CIA program to continue? This bill
meets that test." 234 In other words, Bush principally sought a bill that would

231. Id. (emphasis added).
232. See GELLMAN, supra note 227, at 168 (reporting that President Bush signed the
executive order and then promptly departed for his ranch in Crawford, Texas, leaving various highlevel staff to learn about the order from CNN).
233. Press Release, supra note 56.
234. Id.
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protect the CIA program, not a bill that would revive the military
commissions. 235
Only after touting the successes of the CIA program-advancing claims
that would later be debunked by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
report on the subject 23 6-did President Bush note that the legislation "also
provides a way to deliver justice to the terrorists we have captured." 237 Per
Bush, the commissions authorized by the MCA would "provide a fair trial, in
which the accused are presumed innocent, have access to an attorney, and can
hear all the evidence against them." 23 8 In short, Bush noted, "[t]hese military
commissions are lawful, they are fair, and they are necessary." 23 9 Despite this
sprinkling of shibboleths, the statement clearly conveys the sentiment that the
commissions are an afterthought, secondary in importance to the CIA's
authority to detain and interrogate suspects in the War on Terror.
Further, though President Obama later sought to improve the
commissions, his statements and actions did little to convey his confidence that
the commissions could be trusted to carry out their important work. In fact,
Obama actively reinforced Cheney's foundational principle. Initially, Obama
effectively gave the commissions a vote of no-confidence while campaigning
for president, expressing skepticism about them and raising the possibility of
closing them altogether. 0 His related plan to try the 9/11 defendants in the

235.

Ultimately, detainees who were tortured as part of the CIA program (including al-

Nashiri) would find themselves defendants before the commissions, creating pressure to reform the
commission rules that previously permitted coerced testimony.

236.

Compare Press Release, supra note 56 ("By allowing the CIA program to go forward,

this bill is preserving a tool that has saved American lives. The CIA program helped us gain vital
intelligence from Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Ramzi Binalshibh, two of the men believed to
have helped plan and facilitate the 9/11 attacks. The CIA program helped break up a cell of 17
southeastern Asian terrorist operatives who were being groomed for attacks inside the United States.

The CIA program helped us uncover key operatives in al Qaeda's biological weapons program,
including a cell developing anthrax to be used interrorist attacks.") with S. REP. No. 113-288, at xxi (2014) ("The CIA's use of its enhanced interrogation techniques was not an effective means of
acquiring intelligence or gaining cooperation from detainees.... [and t]he CIA's justification for
the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques rested on inaccurate claims of their effectiveness.").
237. Press Release, supra note 56.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240.

See Connie Bruck, Why Obama Has FailedTo Close Guantdnamo, NEW YORKER (July

25, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/08/01/why-obama-has-failed-to-closeguantanamo (noting that "[b]oth Hillary Clinton, Obama's main opponent in the Democratic
primaries, and McCain, the Republican nominee and a former prisoner of war in North Vietnam,
endorsed [closing the prison facilities at Guantinamo]. But Obama spoke about the issue with
particular passion."); Morris Davis, Obama and Change at Guantanamo: Believe It When You See

It, HUFFPOST (June 27, 2010, 5:12 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/obama-and-change-atguant b_553113 (describing candidate Obama as promising to "'close the detention facility at
Guantanamo' and 'reject the Military Commissions Act') (quoting BARACKOBAMA.COM (2008)).
Some observers primarily blame President Obama for the failure to close the detention facility at
Guantnamo. See Spencer Ackerman, 'No One But Himselfto Blame': How Obamas Guantanamo
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Southern District of New York faced political backlash and never came to
fruition, 2 41 but it sent the same signal. Moreover, recall that Obama ended the
second phase of the commissions by pausing proceedings in 2009 to study a
better way forward. 24 2 At the time, he proposed key structural changes that
would later become law and he argued that "[t]hese reforms willbegin to restore
the Commissions as a legitimate forum for prosecution," 243 therefore implying
that the commissions would remain illegitimate even upon entering their third
and current phase. And when Obama signed the MCA of 2009 into law, he
focused on other elements of the bill and did not mention the commissions at
all.2

44

Indeed, even as President Obama sought to distinguish his views in the
War on Terror from Vice President Cheney's, he still remained committed to
the underlying idea that the defendants at the military commissions were
entitled to less favorable treatment than other defendants. During a March 2009
interview that Obama gave to 60 Minutes, he stated this position clearly:
The whole premise of Guantinamo, promoted by Vice President
Cheney, was that somehow the American system of justice was not
up to the task of dealing with these terrorists. I fundamentally
disagree with that. Now, do thesefolks deserve Miranda rights? Do
they deserve to be treated like a shoplifter down the block? Of
course not.245
To the extent that Congress was instrumental in pushing the commissions
into their second and third phases, the views of individual congressmen and
congresswomen, as expressed at the time, might seem to hold promise to
undermine this narrative. But unlike the Bush and Obama Administrations,
which tended to take relatively uniform positions expressed by figures at the top
of the administrative hierarchy, the picture in Congress was mixed at best.
Moreover, congressional viewpoints on the commissions remained relatively
muted and, collectively, did more to reinforce the story emanating from the
executive branch than to contradict it.
For example, there was limited floor debate about the true significance of
revising the military commissions in the lead-up to the passage of the MCA of
2009, the start of the commissions' third phase. There was, however, some
debate at the committee level, where various members of Congress expressed
views of the commissions and related matters. In one such hearing in the House

Plans Fell Through, GUARDIAN (Feb. 24, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://amp.theguardian.com/usnews/2016/feb/24/obama-guantanamo-bay-closure-republicans?
twitter impression=true
(articulating that view).
241. Scott Shane & Benjamin Weiser, U.S. Drops Plan for a 9/11 Trial in New York City,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/30/nyregion/30trial.html.
242.

See supra note 69 and accompanying text.

243.

Press Release, supra note 66 (emphasis added).

244.

See Press Release, supra note 72 (omittingany reference to the military commissions).

245.

CBS, President Obama, Part One at 18:53, YouTUBE

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RVwq4-MEiA4(emphasisadded).

(Mar. 22, 2009),
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that took place in July of 2009, Republican Lamar Smith expressed his concern
that U.S. policy might have shifted in favor of Mirandizing terror suspects,
notwithstanding President Obama's statement to 60 Minutes (which Smith
quoted). 24 6 By contrast, some Democrats-such as Hank Johnson 247 and Adam
Schiffm-saw the commissions as beyond repair from the standpoint of
providing justice.29 Witnesses called by the Democrats forcefully supported
that view. 25 0 At another committee hearing in the House, Republicans Randy
ForbeS 2 51 and Roscoe Bartlett 2 52 questioned why the United States should bother
to try these defendants at all when the Obama Administration's stated position
was to detain these defendants throughout the War on Terror (to prevent them
from rejoining hostilities) regardless of the verdict. But the representatives did
not clearly state their positions on what the MCA of 2009 could, would, or
should achieve with respect to the aims of the commissions themselves. 523
In the Senate, Carl Levin-the Chairman of the Senate Armed Service
Committee, which took the lead in drafting the Senate legislation that became

246.

Legal Issues Surrounding the Military Commissions System: Hearing Before the

Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights & Civil Liberties of the H. Common the Judiciary,
111th Cong. 5 (2009) [hereinafter Legal Issues] (statement of Sen. Lamar Smith). At a different
hearing, Democratic Representative Patrick Murphy also asked whether military personnel were

Mirandizing detainees encountered on the battlefield. See Reforming the Military Commissions Act
of 2006 and Detainee Policy: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Armed Servs., 11ith Cong. 14

(2009) [hereinafter Reforming] (statement of Rep. Patrick Murphy).
247. See Legal Issues, supra note 246, at 9 (statement of Rep. Hank Johnson).
248. See id. at I I(statement of Rep. Adam Schiff). Schiff went so far as to propose
legislation that would result in the trial of commission defendants by traditional courts-martial
proceedings instead. See id. at 12.
249. Other witnesses who testified at the hearing took the same view. See, e.g., id. at 20
(statement of Darrel J. Vandeveld, Lieutenant Colonel and Former Prosecutor of Guantinamo Bay
Military Commissions) (offering a statement as a former commission prosecutor, that "[t]he military
commissions cannot be fixed, because their very creation-and the only reason to prefer military
commissions over federal criminal courts for the Guantanamo detainees-can now be clearly seen
as an artifice, a contrivance, to try to obtain prosecutions based on evidence that would not be
admissible in any civilian or military prosecution anywhere in our nation.").
250. See id. at 12 (statement of Rep. Adam Schiff).
251. See Reforming, supra note 246, at 20 (statement of Rep. Randy Forbes).
252. See id. at 41 (statement of Rep. Roscoe Bartlett). Bartlett seemed to prefer an
international tribunal to the military commissions. See id. ("Why don't we move these prisoners to
an international arena and avoid all of the national stigma that we are going to get from these
proceedings, no matter what we do and how careful we are?").
253. See generally id. (where many House Representatives focused on President Obama's
commitment to closing the detention facility at Guantinamo, and especially the risks of transferring
detainees to the United States or releasing detainees altogether, more so than on whether the MCA
of 2009 would improve the commissions in a way that rendered them fairer or more effective trial
venues);see also Legal Issues, supra note 246, at 5 (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith) (generally

omitting statements about the speaker's perceived relationship of the MCA of 2006 and the MCA
of 2009).
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the MCA of 2009 254-expressed the view that the MCA of 2009 was necessary
but not sufficient to restore the American public's confidence in the
commissions. 25 5 Specifically, Senator Levin observed that deficiencies in the
MCA of 2006 had "placed a cloud over military commissions and . . led some
to conclude that the use of military commissions can never be fair, credible, or
consistent with our basic principles ofjustice." 25 6 But he expressed confidence
that the commissions could be brought up to the Supreme Court's standards (set
out in Hamdan) and thereafter "play a legitimate role in prosecuting violations
of the law of war." 25 7
But Senator Levin's view is an outlier in the Congressional record, and
others adopted a markedly different perspective. For example, Senator Joseph
Lieberman emphasized his commitment to some version of Cheney's principle:
I think [attempting to try some of these defendants in Article
III courts] puts us in a very odd position. We're giving these
terrorists greater protections in our Federal courts than we've given
war criminals at any other time throughout our history, even though
in my opinion they are at least as brutal and inhumane, probably
more brutal and inhumane, than any war criminals we've
apprehended over the course of the many wars we've been involved
in.
Yes, it may also be an act of murder to have killed people who
were in the Twin Towers on September 11, but it was an act of war
and the people who did that don't deserve the same constitutional
protections in our Federal courts as people who may be accused of
murder in New York City. I say, New York City because the attack
8
was there. 25
And Senator Mel Martinez agreed with Senator Lieberman:
I think that it's fascinating for us to discuss a person like Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed, who didn't wear a uniform and in fact inflicted
great harm upon civilians, not only here but in other parts of the
world. He considers himself to be a part of a movement, of a political

254.

See Legal Issues Regarding Military Commissions and the Trial of Detainees for

Violations ofthe Law ofWar: Hearing Before the S. Comm. onArmedServs., 11lth Cong. 12 (2009)

(statement of David Kris, Assistant Attorney General) (noting "how much the administration
appreciates the [Senate Armed Services] committee's leadership, and the very thoughtful bill it has
drafted").
255.

See id. at 4 (statement of Sen. Carl Levin, Chairman, S. Comm. on Armed Servs.)

(noting that "even ifwe're able to enact new legislationthat successfully addresses the shortcomings
in existing law, we still have a long way to go to restore public confidence in military commissions
and the justice that they produce. However, we will not be able to restore confidence in military

commissions at all unless we first substitute new procedures and language to address the problems
with the existing statute.").
256. Id. at 2.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 39 (statement of Sen. Joe Lieberman).
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movement, that we would then consider a person like that to have a
preference for trying him as a criminal under Title 18 in an Article
III court and according him an additional set of legal rights as
opposed to in a military tribunal.
... I truly believe that these are not criminals, that these are people
engaged in a very profound battle against this country as part of a
non-state actor for some of them, but they nonetheless do not really
belong [sic] treated as criminals, but as people that are involved in
something much deeper and greater than that.259

Thus, as one would expect, Congress hardly spoke with one voice on the matter.
But even as they debated inaugurating the commissions into their third and
present phase, a number of members of Congress had already rejected the
commissions categorically, and others had adopted some version of the view
that the commission defendants were entitled to worse treatment as a matter of
principle than other defendants.
Moreover, subsequent reporting has also revealed the private views of key
administrative officials that bear on our understanding of the commissions and
their initial purpose. For example, although President Bush authorized the
commissions in 2001, no prosecutions began until 2004.260 By late 2003, Bush
reportedly had become frustrated by the delays, 2 61 but other high-ranking White
House officials had not. Vice President Cheney was apparently "not in any
hurry to see a trial"; 262 and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, whose DOD
held the detainees and was obliged to fill in the gaps of Bush's executive order
to operationalize the commissions, "wanted no part of Gitmo [(Guantnamo)]
at all." 26 3 The prevailing view among some of these officials was that "[t]he
detainees were locked up and disabled," and there was no need to rush to trial
264
in the absence of a law requiring a speedy resolution of their situations.
Indeed, even after being ordered by Bush to initiate commission prosecutions
in late 2003, "Cheney and Rumsfeld would slow-roll the tribunals for many
265
months to come."
Rarely will a single overarching motivation lie behind any initiative that
requires the endorsement and cooperation of so many people. The federal
government is no monolith, especially when considered across a span of years
and multiple administrations. It is plainly the case that some officials associated
with the commissions (and not just members of the defense teams) would like
them, above all, to produce trial results that are accepted by the public, as the

259.
260.

See id. at 39-40 (statement of Sen. Mel Martinez) (emphasis added).
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.

261.

See GELLMAN, supra note 227, at 338-40.

262.
263.
264.
265.

Id. at 339-40.
Id. (quoting a participant in a key December 2003 Situation Room meeting).
Id.
Id. at 340.
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examples listed above demonstrate. 2 6 6 For those officials, perhaps it is correct
to say that the commissions have failed, at least thus far.
But the genesis of the commissions presents a surprisingly clear account
of their purpose-and that purpose is most assuredly not to seek justice in a
manner analogous to other conventional courts, whether civilian or military.
The driving force behind the executive order that created the commissionsVice President Cheney-made his aims plain and seemed unconcerned that the
system itself was not being put to use in its early years. The presidential
statements that followed evinced equivocation about the commissions' value
and doubt about their legitimacy, as well as a commitment to the underlying
view that commission defendants are morally unworthy. Key members of
Congress reiterated that latter view as well. At minimum, it is far from clear
that the officials most responsible for the commissions would be dismayed by
their current state. Perhaps the public can be forgiven for failing to read between
the lines of these statements and silences, but the implications for those
associated with the commissions are manifest.
This backstory makes sense. Even without recourse to the record
surrounding the commissions, the context for their creation alone should caution
against a credulous interpretation of their purpose when undertaking a serious
review of their performance. Like so much of the counter-terrorism policy that
remains in effect today, the commissions rose from the ashes of the World Trade
Center. They were born in the chaotic weeks immediately after the 9/11 attacks
and designed by officials who prioritized detention, interrogation, and other
"aggressive" action against other would-be attackers. And they were built to
try perhaps the single most unsympathetic class of defendants in the country.
Accepting the proposition that Vice President Cheney's foundational
principle successfully permeated the commissions is both plausible and the
single most powerful assumption one can make to explain the state of the
commissions today.2 6 7 If any key officials-judges, prosecutors, authorities
within relevant intelligence agencies, whoever-accept that view, those
officials can justify a wide range of interference with the defendants, whether
for self-serving purposes or otherwise. 2 6 8 That, in turn, would yield results of

266.

See supra notes 211-19 and accompanying text.

267. See Koh, supra note 1, at 340-42 (suggesting that the initial order authorizing the
military commissions was an expression of vengeance that undermined four important values:

holding perpetrators ofterrorist attacks accountable, "tellingthe world the trth" abouttheir crimes,
illustrating that their actions "violate all norms of civilized society," and demonstrating our own
respect for human rights) (emphasis omitted).
268. Though it would require speculation, one might attribute a number of the problematic
incidents described above to pure careerism-the subordination of proper prosecutorial norms to
the personal career advancement of officials involved in the commissions. Although careerism may
undermine proceedings in other venues as well, the argument advanced here is that the cultural
resistance to its manifestation (as well as the resistance to manifestations of other forms of
misconduct) is weaker in a setting where the rights of the defendants are seen as inherently and by
definition less important. It is for this reason that I have not endeavored with more specificity to
illuminate the competing cultures of Article III courts or courts-martial, a significant undertaking
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the sort that the commissions have produced thus far, even if such a view were
accepted by only a handful of people. If some officials believe the defendants
do not fundamentally deserve attorney representation, it is no longer perplexing
that hacking the attorney-client relationships of the defendants seems more the
norm than the exception-e specially if officials also believe that the defendants
may possess valuable intelligence. Similarly, if the defendants are thought to
be fortunate to face a judge at all, it is no longer surprising that some prosecutors
may feel a reflexive impulse to oppose reasonable requests from the defendants
or that some judges lose their sensitivity to the appearance of pro-prosecution
bias. The consistently poor record of the commissions before the D.C. Circuit
generally, and the shock expressed by the D.C. Circuit about what occurred in
the matter of Judge Spath specifically, are also both explicable by reference to
a difference in norms between the military commissions system and the Article
III system.
This is not to allege some sort of elaborate conspiracy theory-for
example, that Vice President Cheney and others around him manipulated the
commissions into playing out in practice in a specific, preordained fashion.
Rather, the performance of the commissions to date is very much explicablebest explained, I contend-if we accept that numerous agents with power over
the proceedings internalized the notion that the defendants are entitled to worse
treatment than defendants in other venues. In the alternative, one would have
to accept that it is sheer coincidence that that was the precise view of the
commissions that the administrationexpressed when creatingthem and that was
the same view that key officials, including the subsequent President, continued
to express even years later.
Moreover, it is not difficult to identify alternative plausible functions that
the commissions might serve for the administration, even if they were initially
created for the purpose of treating defendants as second-class. From the start,
the commissions provided cover for the administration to pursue aggressive
action on other fronts of the War on Terror, offering allies and other foreign
governments at least a head-fake away from indefinite detention while taking

of its own that has independent merit but is not essential here. After all, the founding norm of the
commissions is just that they should be less favorable than those other venues. One might be
inclined nevertheless to press the objection further by noting that this Article does not set a baseline
for rates of misconduct in competing venues, complicating efforts to ascertain the extent to which
the commissions are more compromised than alternatives. That is true enough; it is likely impossible
to set such a baseline, no matter how helpful it would be, and I have not attempted to set one here.
But I maintain that the performance of the commissions speaks for itself in this regard. The
numerous troubling incidents described above-of necessity, a mere sampling-stand in stark
contrast to the small number of cases that have passed through the system. See Cases, supra note
92 (listing a total of forty cases over the life of the commissions, some ofthem arguably duplicative).

These incidents, which would constitute notable irregularities in other venues, have quite simply
come to characterize the proceedings at Guantinamo. That conclusion should be evident even if it
is impossible to calculate the precise extent to which the commissions underperform alternative
venues.
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accused terrorists "off the board." 2 6 9 And the commissions most assuredly serve
an expressive and retributive function, consistent with other elements of the War
on Terror, conveying a low regard for foreign terror suspects. With respect to
the last of these, at minimum, the commissions have most certainly
succeeded. 27 0
This seemingly jaundiced view of the commissions is precisely the view
warranted by the evidence,271 yet there seems to be broad reluctance among
scholars and advocates to engage with the possibility that the commissions are
not fundamentally about seeking justice in a traditional sense. 27 2 Writing about

269. See supra notes 261-64 and accompanying text. Perhaps others would argue that the
commissions were designed to facilitate convictions, even if not rapidly, by stacking the deck
against the defendants. See, e.g., Dratel, supra note 19, at 1358 (articulating a preference for
prosecution of suspected terrorists in Article III courts because, unlike the commissions, those

courts "constitute alegitimate system inwhichjustice is atleastpossible and the designof whichis
not merely to guarantee convictions"). Dratel also responds directly to "proponents of military
commissionswho see them as abarrel inwhichto prosecute alleged terrorist fish." Id. To the extent
ensuring convictions was the aim, it is difficult to say the commissions have succeeded; but with
the major cases still in pre-trial proceedings, it is arguably too early to make an assessment on that
front.
270. As noted above, this is not to deny that some officials may prioritize the traditional trial
function of the commissions, and, to the extent that occurs, it is laudable. But, in light of their
origins, it is unrealistic to think that treating the defendants fairly or operating efficiently was ever
the overarching priority-or, at minimum, would ever be internalized as the overarching priority by
those tasked with operating the commissions.
271. Emily Berman has suggested to me another possible framing for the proposition
defended in this Section-namely, that the commissions were "designed to fail." This is an
interesting possibility; it is certainly closer to the truth than the notion that the commissions were
designed to operate fairly, openly, and reasonably quickly, but it is also substantively different from
my own view. The difference is this: designing the commissions to treat the defendants poorly is an
affirmative goal that is consistent with multiple outcomes because it permits officials to subvert the
process at any number of levels and for the purpose of advancing any number of secondary
objectives (such as intelligence-gathering, personal career advancement, or something else entirely).
One possible outcome that results from such a design would be that the defendants are forced to
languish as they maneuver their way slowly through a byzantine process that invites numerous
appeals. Another possible outcome is the generation of quick convictions on charges that would be
difficult to bring in another venue. (That both of these are viable outcomes explains why it is no
objection to my view that there have been only a handful of convictions.) Although it was very
much foreseeable, ex ante, that the first of these possibilities was more likely to obtain, that was not
a given-and, in fact, the second possibility could well have materialized if the governing norms
identified in this Article had come to reach even deeper into the proceedings than they ultimately
have thus far (such as by compromising the defense teams as well). By contrast, I interpret the
prospect of designing the commissions to fail as specifically planning for the first of these two
possibilities: creating a complex and novel system specifically because it would be ponderous.
272. This is especially interesting given the broad skepticism the commissions faced when
they were first established. See, e.g., Lardner, supra note 3 (reporting that such skepticism came
from sources on different ends of the political spectrum); see also Koh, supra note 1, at 344 (arguing
that the military commissions as initially constituted would simply be unable to provide "credible
justice").
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the USCMCR specifically, Viadeck has expressed some awareness of this
possibility, though he appears to have framed it tongue in cheek. After
describing the USCMCR as a failure, he noted that "the CMCR could only be
considered a 'success' if Congress's goal was either (1) to create a structurally
flawed, woefully inefficient, and substantively inaccurate mechanism to slow
down military commission cases; or (2) to provide interesting fodder for federal
courts professors."273 Vladeck almost certainly intended this as a joke, given
that nobody would seriously believe that Congress wants to "provide interesting
fodder for federal courts professors." 27 4 But, it turns out, the first option he
identifies is not so far from the truth. Although it may be unfair to say that
Congress as a whole deliberately designed the USCMCR to be a flawed and
inefficient body that would serve to impede the commissions, there is ample
reason to conclude that the USCMCR's performance upholds the ideals of the
commissions' originators.
IV. TE

LESSONS OF THE COMMISSIONS

Accepting these two propositions-that the performance of the
commissions follows largely from their governing norms and that the
nontraditional governing norms of the commissions are in fact very much
consistent with the views of the commissions' creators-reveals a number of
important lessons that are easy to miss if we focus primarily on the structural
deficiencies of the commissions system.
First, the structural features of a trial system alone are not enough to secure
efficient, fair outcomes that invite the confidence of observers. Structural
features (like particular procedural rules) may be easier to identify and critique,
but improving the rules at the commissions alone has not correlated with better
results. That remains true even if the revisions have been undertaken primarily
by legislators who intend for the commissions to bring about just results. The
original norms persist, notwithstanding structural changes.
Shared commitment to the rules of the system (or at least to avoiding
penalties assessed for violating the rules) is a predicate for broad compliance
with the rules. That has obviously been lacking at the commissions; some of
the instances detailed above clearly involve violations of commission rules,
such as Judge Spath's violations of the rules governing judicial conduct. But
even perfect compliance with the rules of a system does not necessarily bring
aboutjust results or inspire the confidence of the public. When the D.C. Circuit
vacated most of Judge Spath's opinions in the al-Nashiri matter, it also chided
the DOJ, the prosecution team and the USCMCR; but it did not indicate that
any of those entities had violated a specific rule or statute. Instead it suggested
that these elements of the commissions had fallen short of a broader obligation

273. Vladeck, supra note 5. As noted above, Vladeck primarily blames Congress for the
poor performance of the USCMCR, attributing it to poor design. See supra note 172. Though that
is a relatively narrow point, it suggests a significant disagreement between us about whether to
blame structural or cultural issues for the performance ofthe commissions.
274.

Vladeck, supra note 5.
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to shoulder their respective share of the collective responsibility of criminal
justice.27 They neglected to take seriously a manifest violation of the rules by
the trial-level judge; and although their neglect did not entail a formal violation
of the rules binding each of them, respectively, the appearance of bias arose
nevertheless, as did the basis for the D.C. Circuit's criticism.
A second lesson here is that the preference many observers express for the
use of Article III courts to try the commission defendants can be explained not
simply by reference to the structural features of those courts. Thus, when Chief
Prosecutor Mark Martins argues that, formally speaking, the commissions are
not that different from other courts, he seems to be missing the point. Or, put
another way, if the formal features of the commissions are so similar to the
courts against which critics routinely compare them, then something else must
explain the disparate results generated by the different systems. Article III
courts, with all of their imperfections, operate under superior norms-as
evidenced most recently by the D.C. Circuit's surprise at the comportment of
multiple elements of the commissions system. It is of course plausible that there
is a link between the rules of a system and the governing norms and that the
structural features of Article III courts help explain their superior ethos.
Nevertheless, at this point, the gap between Article III courts and the
Guantinamo Bay Military Commissions is wider at the level of norms than it is
at the level of formal structure.
Third, norms are extremely powerful. 2 7 6 The orientation that a judge (or
other official in the criminal justice system) has toward his responsibilities is
extremely important for guiding his or her decisions even within the bounds of
the rules. Improper animus of any sort can have far-reaching implications for
outcomes in trial proceedings, even without documented misconduct. Consider
the deep divide between Judge Spath and the D.C. Circuit on the conduct of alNashiri's defense team. Several months into his standoff with the defense, and
less than a month before abating proceedings indefinitely to contemplate his
retirement, Judge Spath accused "the defense community [of] making strategic
and tactical decisions to delay." 2 7 7 Recall further that, in abating proceedings a
few weeks later, Judge Spath also acknowledged that his "frustration with the
defense [had] been apparent" for months.2 7 8 That frustration was almost
certainly genuine. It no doubt played a role in his decision to confine CDC John
Baker, as well as to seek writs of attachment to arrest defense attorneys Rosa
Eliades and Mary Spears. Yet, the conduct of the defense team that so frustrated

275.
276.

See In re al-Nashiri, 921 F.3d 224, 239-40 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
See generally Pozen, supra note 21 (arguing that the U.S. government's approach to

preventing leaks of classified information relies more heavily on informal norms than on the formal
legal regime put in place to provide for the protection of such information).

277. In re al-Nashiri, 921 F.3d at 230 (alteration in original) (quoting Commission
Transcript 11072 (Jan. 19, 2018)).
278. Id. at 231 (quoting Commission Transcript 12364 (Feb. 16, 2018)).

2020] THE CYNICAL SUCCESSES OF GUANTANAMO BAY MILITARY COMMISSIONS

49

Judge Spath invited the praise of the D.C. Circuit. 27 9 There is thus a gaping
chasm between Judge Spath's stance and the stance of the circuit on the conduct
and role of the defense team; their views are quite literally on opposite ends of
a spectrum. Moreover, there is little basis for meaningful disagreement over the
facts in this scenario. The difference is entirely one of norms.
Fourth, the norm that a particular class of defendants is less deserving of
rights than other defendants (or relatedly, that the rights enjoyed by a defendant
are a matter of the State's generosity) is particularly pernicious and corrosive.
It does not have to be universally shared-and it has not been universally shared
at the commissions-to lay the foundation for irregularities. 82 0
Rights
recognized by the grace of the State are flimsy and vulnerable to being treated
as courtesies rather than entitlements. 2 81 It is difficult to muster sympathy for
defendants accused of the 9/11 attacks, but that is precisely why (at least for
those who seek reliable convictions and exonerations) the protections of the
defendants' rights must be sturdy and nonnegotiable. 28 2 It is not a matter of
sympathy. This lesson has applications in the criminal justice system more
broadly as well. For all of the foregoing discussion of the superior norms
governing Article III courts, there are longstanding and compelling critiques of
biases ingrained within those courts that may parallel, and will certainly predate,
those from the commissions. 28 3
Fifth, and relatedly, creating a trial system from scratch is a perilous
exercise, not only because it is time-consuming and requires generating
procedures and rules that may interact in unforeseen ways or generate novel

279.

Id. at 239-40 ("Yet in this case, save for Al-Nashiri's defense counsel, all elements of

the military commission system ... failed to live up to [the shared] responsibility [of criminal
justice].").
280. To be clear, I am not in a position to attribute acceptance of this specific norm to any
commission official, including Judge Spath. But, it clearly characterized Vice President Cheney's
view, and there is significant evidence that it has taken hold at the commissions.
281. See, e.g., supra note 130 and accompanying text; In re al-Nashiri, 921 F.3d at 230
(citing Judge Spath's ruling that al-Nashiri was not entitled to capital defense counsel "at every
aspect of every proceeding,... especially when it doesn't relate to capital matters.") (quoting
Commission Transcript 10084 (Nov. 3, 2017)).
282. Moreover, a number of the detainees in the War on Terror have been held in error. See
Wesley Bruer, Mistaken Identity Keeps Detainee at Guantanamo Bay, CNN (Dec. 2, 2015, 2:35
https://www.cnn.com/2015/12/02/politics/guantanamo-bay-mistaken-identity/index.html
PM),
(reporting on a Guantinamo detainee held for over thirteen years because of mistaken identity); see
also Carol Rosenberg, Victims ofMistaken Identity Among the 10 Sentfrom Guantdnamo to Oman,

MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 17, 2017, 4:38 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/guantanamo/articlel27055319.html
(reporting on the transfer of ten
prisoners from Guantanamo Bay to Oman, including "several men cleared for release for years who
were mistakenly profiled as captives of consequence," one of whom the government had gone so
far as to charge with a crime).
283. See, e.g., Cho, supra note 25, at 1605-09 (arguing that, before the Civil Rights Era,
American courts institutionalized bias against people of color and "promoted unreconstructed
whiteness" through"seemingly neutral strategies to disenfranchise peoples of color in lockstep with
sociopolitical forces that sought to restore the South's honor.").
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legal issues that are ripe for challenge on constitutional or statutory grounds; the
system's creators must also take significant care to shape the system's ethos.
That is particularly delicate in a context where a viable system already exists,
and the creation of a new system expressly or impliedly suggests a perceived
problem with using the extant one. Of course, in the case of the military
commissions at Guantinamo Bay, the perception that Article III courts are more
protective of the defendants was used as a foil, in part, to justify the
commissions; the comparatively weaker defendants' rights at the commissions
were a feature, not a bug. But even if that were not the case, there would remain
a risk that creating a separate system for a particular class of defendants by itself
connotes inequality-even under circumstances where there is a defensible
rationale for a separate system (such as, for those who accept it, the reasoning
offered by Mark Martins to the effect that the remote location of the crime
scenes requires the modification of certain evidentiary rule 28 4).
A version of this phenomenon has been famously observed in the context
of public education. In Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court
reflected on the effects of segregated schools:
"Segregation of white and colored children in public schools
has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is
greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of
separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority
of the negro group ....
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine
of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities
28 5
are inherently unequal.
Although the commissions are meant to try aliens, they are not, per se, designed
to try defendants of a specific race. 2 8 6 But the commissions are designed to try
a class of defendants that are widely seen as particularly dangerous or morally
bad-hence the overwhelming votes in both chambers of Congress to ban the
transfer of detainees from Guanthnamo to United States' soil, even for purposes
of trial. 28 7 The creation of a separate trial system for such a category of
284.

See supra note 221.

285. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) (footnotes omitted) (quoting a
finding made by the court in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951)).
286.

The commissions have overwhelmingly, but not exclusively, tried defendants of

Middle Eastern descent. For example, Australian national David Hicks passed through the
commission system during its second phase. See U.S. Acknowledges Conviction of David Hicks,
Guantanamo Detainee, Should Not Stand, PROPUBLICA (Jan. 28, 2015, 12:36 PM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/u.s.-acknowledges-conviction-of-david-hicks-guantanamo-

detainee-not-valid (describing the circumstances surrounding Hicks's guilty plea before a military
commission).
287. See David M. Herszenhorn, Senate Passes Military Bill that Bans Transfers of
Guantdnamo
Detainees,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
10,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/11/us/politics/senate-passes-military-bill-that-bars-transfers-ofguantanamo-detainees.html; see also House Committee Blocks Effort to Allow Transfer of Gitmo
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defendant plausibly fuels the views of officials involved in the commissions that
their system is specially designed for the worst defendants, in turn supporting
an ethos of disregard for the rights of those defendants. 82 8
Sixth, once we have identified a system that manifests a problematic ethos,
it becomes important to monitor the implications of that fact for other adjacent
systems. For one, although the commissions are best regarded as simply another
prong in the War on Terror (rather than a distinct and disparate project), they
constitute a more tightly controlled and observable environment than many
other fronts in the War on Terror. If the norms at the commissions can produce
the results we have witnessed to date, it becomes less surprising that other fronts
involving profiling of travelers, targeted killings abroad, and detention of
suspects have also led to serious abuses. 28 9
This way of looking at the
commissions helps to explain the difficulty of preventing abuses in those other
contexts.
Additionally, to the extent many military judges may regard
administrative law judgeships as "dream" positions, the commissions may well
290
establish a small but notable pipeline channeling judges into such positions.
At least three commission judges have sought to become immigration judges. 291
Moreover, as of May of 2020, Judge Spath remains listed as an active
immigration judge posted in Arlington, Virginia, even though he violated
judicial rules of conduct to secure the position. 2 92 To maintain public
confidence in the government's roster of immigration judges, it will remain
important that the prevailing norms of the military commissions do not
accompany commission alumni who make such transitions.
Seventh and finally, these propositions give us a better understanding of
the reasons for which the commissions will simply never be able to generate
confidence-inspiring trial results. As Vladeck and others have argued, the

Detainees, CONST. PROJECT (May 8, 2014), https://constitutionproject.org/documents/housecomniittee-blocks-effort-to-allow-transfer-of-gitmo-detainees.
288.

A concern about this possibility arose in the House of Representatives during the debate

over the MCA of 2009. See Reforming, supra note 246, at 9-10 (statement of Rep. Howard "Buck"
McKeon) ("[Representative Buck] McKeon[:] Are you concerned at all that dividing up into two
systems and the preference that going to one or the other [sic] might buttress the view that military
commissions are second-class type courts? [Assistant Attorney General David] Kris[:] It is a very

good point.").
289. This logic obviously operates in both directions. Systemic abuses on the other fronts of
the War on Terror has predictive value for setting our expectations for the performance of the
commissions.
290.

See supra note 164 and accompanying text.

291.

In addition to Judge Spath and Judge Schools, Judge J.K. Waits (the first judge in the

Hadi case) also appliedto become an immigration judge. See Carol Rosenberg (@carolrosenberg),

TWITTER

(May

13,

2019,

8:04

PM),

https://twitter.com/search?lang=en&q=Waits%20(from%3Acarolrosenberg)%20until%3A2019-

05-16%20since%3A2019-05-01&src=typed
292.

query.

See EOIR Immigration CourtListing, JUSTICE.Gov, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoir-

immigration-court-listing (last visited May 19, 2020).
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commissions are indeed bound to fail at producing sound convictions (or
appropriate exonerations). I have argued thatthat is not what the commissions
were designed to do; but to the extent some observers hold out hope, or that the
commissions persist in part because the government insists they are essential
for such a purpose, that purpose will never be fulfilled. And the reason is not
that they were badly designed structurally, although they certainly were. It is
that they were created at least in substantial part to relegate their defendants to
a second tier, and too many officials associated with the commissions treat the
defendants in a manner consistent with that idea. Based on nearly two decades
of history, there is simply no reason for optimism that change is forthcoming on
that front. The commissions are also geographically associated with the
detention facility at Guantinamo Bay, the site of now-infamous mistreatment
of detainees. There is thus a very real risk that, even if it were possible to excise
and replace the problematic culture of the commissions, much of the public
would forever link the commissions with the mistreatment of its defendants.
The impulse to assess the commissions against a higher standard, and thus
to view the commissions as failures, is perfectly understandable. Many
observers would like to think more of their government than the arguments
above might suggest. Many would also like nothing more than to see justice
done-to see defendants brought before a judge, with counsel on both sides of
the podium and evidence marshaled, and trustworthy convictions or
exonerations to follow. Family members of the victims of the charged crimes
have routinely traveled to Guantinamo Bay for years now to observe the
proceedings, as have advocates, students, and scholars. Many continue to look
on in disappointment-albeit with a diminishing sense of surprise-at the
accumulating costs, the persistent delays, the successful challenges, and the
various other dramatic irregularities that have characterized the proceedings
since they began.
But the two propositions defended here force us to confront perhaps the
most tragic element of the commissions. It is not that they are a misconceived
but good faith effort to secure justice in an important set of cases. They are,
instead, a fundamentally unserious enterprise nominally oriented around the
most serious of tasks. By allowing its disapproval of a particular class of
defendants to permeate the commissions, the government violated its fair-trial
assurances from the outset. I have argued above that those assurances were
mere pretext; if that is correct, it makes the situation worse. The commissions
system was destined to disappoint the legitimate expectations of the publicexpectations set by the government itself. The very birth of the system and the
cynical successes it has achieved all traded on the public's trust. Even now, the
primary, substantive excuse for continuing the commissions hangs on the
mirage of fair trials materializing at some point on the horizon, the misguided
idea that the commissions may eventually work out their structural kinks and
return reliable results. In short, it is the success of the commissions that renders
them a betrayal rather than merely an expensive mistake.

2020] THE CYNICAL SUCCESSES OF GUANTANAMO BAY MILITARY COMMISSIONS

53

CONCLUSION

This Article ultimately urges a comprehensive reckoning with the military
commissions system created in the wake of the 9/11 attacks rather than a
piecemeal critique of its various formal features. It is tempting to think that the
performance of the commissions has been poor, and thus to conclude that they
have failed. But natural though it may be, that approach requires ignoring
evidence about how and why the system came about, as well as why the
commissions have appeared ineffective. Moreover, ignoring the cynicism
behind the commissions cuts off the only source of value the system has to offer:
its capacity to be instructive. This Article endeavors to ensure that, whatever
happens to the commissions themselves, we do not lose their lessons for the
future.

